Ankit Mehta
@SecvynIndiaTrusted contributorCompletionist
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8,655 detections
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This rule monitors for processes named 'setup.exe' executing from user-writable directories (e.g., AppData, Downloads, Temp) that load unsigned or non-Microsoft DLLs from the same suspicious directories. This pattern is commonly associated with DLL side-loading or malicious installation attempts where a process attempts to load illegitimate code from local user space.
Detects instances where the Outlook process (OUTLOOK.EXE) initiates a network connection over SMB (port 445) to an external, non-private IP address. This behavior is highly suspicious as Microsoft Outlook should typically not be performing direct SMB connections to external systems, and this is often indicative of an adversary attempting to leverage malicious documents or templates to perform credential harvesting via NTLM relay or SMB authentication captures.
Detects the execution of rundll32.exe with command line arguments referencing image file extensions (jpg, jpeg, png, bmp, gif). This is a known technique for bypassing security controls or masquerading malicious code as standard image files.
Detects the execution of rundll32.exe with command line arguments referencing image file extensions (jpg, jpeg, png, bmp, gif). This is a known technique for bypassing security controls or masquerading malicious code as standard image files.
Detects instances where PowerShell.exe is launched by the OneDrive synchronization process, potentially indicating an attempt to mask malicious command execution as a legitimate cloud storage process.
This rule detects potentially malicious usage of rundll32.exe by monitoring for specific command-line indicators associated with APT28, as well as the execution of DLL files from commonly abused directories like Temp, tmp, or ProgramData.
Detects unauthorized processes modifying the registry value 'PONT_STRING' within the Outlook Options General key. This registry value controls the display of content download warnings in Microsoft Outlook. Modifying this key from a non-Outlook process is a technique used by threat actors, such as APT28, to bypass security warnings and facilitate the execution of malicious payloads or content within Outlook.
Detects the opening of suspected APT28 (Fancy Bear) spearphishing lure documents by Microsoft Office or Outlook. The rule monitors for file access, creation, or renaming events where the filename matches known lure patterns associated with APT28 activities, such as naming conventions containing 'BULLETEN', 'OperInformativ', 'Courses', 'Consultation', 'Weapons', or 'Smuggling' in Word or Outlook processes.
This rule monitors for the execution of files or processes matching known file hashes associated with the APT28 (Fancy Bear/Strontium) threat group, specifically detecting SimpleLoader and various NotDoor components.
Detects modifications to the Outlook Security registry key, specifically setting the 'Level' value to '1'. This configuration (often associated with 'OutlookSecurityMode' or related programmatic access policies) can be used by adversaries to bypass security prompts when accessing the Outlook Object Model, allowing malicious scripts or applications to interact with Outlook to send emails, harvest contacts, or access attachments without user intervention.
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