Ankit Mehta
@SecvynIndiaTrusted contributorCompletionist
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This rule detects the use of .NET deserialization gadgets, often associated with malware loaders like Remcos RAT, by monitoring process command lines for specific keywords such as 'ObjectInputStream', 'DeserializeObject', 'BinaryFormatter', or 'NetDataContractSerializer'. It further refines detection by looking for processes with file names starting with 'GST' or specifically 'Optimax.dll', which are indicators of the Remcos loader.
Detects file events related to potential Remcos RAT loader activity, specifically looking for files with names starting with 'GST' or containing 'GST_' and within a specific size range (1KB to 1000KB). This pattern is indicative of a known Remcos RAT loader.
This rule detects the creation of Okta API tokens with broad administrative scopes (okta.users.manage, okta.factors.manage, or okta.apps.manage) by the same user multiple times within a one-hour window. This behavior can indicate an attempt to establish persistent access or bypass multi-factor authentication.
Detects network connections to known IP addresses associated with Remcos RAT loader infrastructure, identified by specific URL patterns indicative of loader-as-a-service operations. The rule triggers if a device makes 3 or more requests to these URLs within an hour.
This rule detects suspicious command-line activity that may indicate the leakage of API keys, specifically those resembling OpenAI API keys (starting with 'sk-', 'sk_live_', or 'sk_test_'). It looks for these patterns in conjunction with common data transfer utilities like curl, wget, powershell, or python, when executed by a process that is not a standard shell or explorer process. The rule triggers if two or more such events occur within an hour on the same computer.
This rule detects command-line activity indicative of encryption key extraction or dumping. It looks for specific keywords like 'dumpkey', 'exportkey', 'savekey', 'keystore', and 'privkey' in the command line of processes such as 'servertool.exe', 'encrypt.exe', 'powershell.exe', and 'cmd.exe'. This activity is often associated with ransomware or other malicious software attempting to exfiltrate cryptographic keys.
This rule detects network connections to common lateral movement ports (SMB, NetBIOS, RDP, FTP, Telnet, SSH) occurring within a 30-minute window before or a 60-minute window after the execution of known ransomware encryption binaries ('servertool.exe', 'encrypt.exe'). This correlation aims to identify post-encryption lateral movement attempts by ransomware, potentially for further compromise or data exfiltration.
Detects the execution of executable files (.exe) within a user's 'Music' folder, which is an unusual location for legitimate program execution. This activity is often associated with ransomware, such as Prinz Eugen, attempting to encrypt user files. The rule excludes executions initiated by common archive utilities (explorer.exe, winrar.exe, 7z.exe) to reduce false positives.
Detects command-line activity indicative of timestomping, specifically when 'cmd.exe' is used with file copy/move commands ('copy', 'xcopy', 'robocopy', 'move') and the target path is not within 'Program Files' or 'Windows' directories. This behavior is often associated with ransomware like Prinz Eugen attempting to hide its activities.
This rule detects potential Prinz Eugen ransomware activity by identifying instances where drive letter enumeration commands (wmic.exe logicaldisk, fsutil.exe fsinfo, diskpart.exe) are executed, followed within 30 minutes by the execution of known ransomware executables (servertool.exe, encrypt.exe) on the same device. This sequence of events suggests reconnaissance prior to data encryption.
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