Ankit Mehta
@SecvynIndiaTrusted contributorCompletionist
7 followers9,573 downloads10,246 copies160 likes55,581 views
8,655 detections
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Detects the creation of WMI event subscriptions, which can be used by adversaries for persistence. The rule specifically looks for command-line arguments related to WMI namespace manipulation or PowerShell cmdlets for WMI event creation.
This rule detects modifications to the 'AppInit_DLLs' or 'LoadAppInit_DLLs' registry keys, which can be used by adversaries to establish persistence. When these registry keys are modified, a DLL specified in their values will be loaded into nearly every process that loads user32.dll, providing a mechanism for arbitrary code execution.
This rule detects suspicious command-line activity related to Duo Security administration. It looks for processes executing with 'duo_client', 'duo_admin', or 'duo_api' in their command line, combined with sensitive parameters like '--admin-api', '--key', '--secret', or 'token'. The rule specifically excludes processes spawned by 'powershell.exe' or 'cmd.exe' to reduce noise, and triggers if such activity occurs at least twice within an hour on the same computer by the same user. This could indicate an attempt to manipulate Duo Security configurations, potentially to bypass multi-factor authentication.
This rule detects suspicious process activity indicative of process injection, specifically looking for the creation of remote threads combined with memory allocation, writing to process memory, and loading of DLLs. It monitors Security Event ID 4688 (a process creation event) and filters for command-line arguments containing functions commonly used in process injection techniques such as 'CreateRemoteThread', 'VirtualAllocEx', 'WriteProcessMemory', 'GetProcAddress', and references to '.dll' or 'LoadLibrary'. A count of such events within an hour is then used to identify potential injection attempts.
This rule detects modifications to Windows service executable paths or service paths (ImagePath, ServicePath) where the new value points to common temporary directories (Temp, AppData, %temp%). This behavior can indicate an attempt by an adversary to persist on a system by modifying legitimate services to execute malicious payloads from temporary locations, often used for staging or evasion.
Detects the creation of multiple service principals with administrative or sensitive keywords in their names within a short timeframe, potentially indicating an attempt to establish persistence or escalate privileges in a cloud environment. The rule specifically looks for service principals containing 'admin', 'sync', 'backup', or 'audit' in their display names, created by users outside of Microsoft's internal domains.
This rule detects devices making a high volume of DNS queries (50 or more within a 5-minute window) to domains that have 4 or more subdomains and are not common legitimate services like microsoft.com, google.com, or amazon.com. This pattern can be indicative of DNS beaconing, a technique used by adversaries for command and control (C2) communication or data exfiltration.
This rule detects the execution of multiple commands commonly used by adversaries to inhibit system recovery, often seen in ransomware attacks. Specifically, it looks for the use of 'vssadmin delete shadows', 'wbadmin delete catalog', 'bcdedit /set', or 'diskpart' in conjunction with '/quiet' or '/force' parameters, and triggers if two or more such commands are executed within an hour on the same computer by the same user.
This rule detects an account performing multiple interactive logons (LogonType 2) from at least 3 unique IP addresses within a 5-minute window. This behavior can indicate credential compromise or an adversary attempting to move laterally or access multiple systems using stolen credentials.
This rule detects the creation of new Windows services (EventID 7045) where the service executable path does not reside in a standard System32 directory (unless it's in a Temp directory) and the executable name contains common scripting interpreters like 'powershell', 'cmd', or 'cscript'. This pattern is often indicative of persistence mechanisms established by adversaries using scripting languages.
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