Siddhant Mishra
@SiddhantMumbaiCompletionist
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159 detections
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Detects a privileged password change shortly after failed authentication attempts
against the vault. An attacker who gains vault access frequently rotates the
credential to lock out the legitimate owner and secure their own hold on it.
The sequence matters more than either event alone: failures followed by a successful
change is the pattern, and a change on its own is routine.
Onboarding: CYBERARK is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 279).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='CYBERARK' and action='PASSWORD_CHANGED'
| groupby user, targetuser, srcip, reason
against the vault. An attacker who gains vault access frequently rotates the
credential to lock out the legitimate owner and secure their own hold on it.
The sequence matters more than either event alone: failures followed by a successful
change is the pattern, and a change on its own is routine.
Onboarding: CYBERARK is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 279).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='CYBERARK' and action='PASSWORD_CHANGED'
| groupby user, targetuser, srcip, reason
Detects repeated lease denials for one MAC address. Denials occur when a device is
refused an address — commonly because it is not permitted on the segment — so a
device persistently retrying is attempting to join a network it has been excluded
from.
Onboarding: WIN-DHCP is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 79).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=dhcp where sourcename='WIN-DHCP' and action='IP_LEASE_DENIED'
| duration 1h
| groupby macaddress, resultcode
refused an address — commonly because it is not permitted on the segment — so a
device persistently retrying is attempting to join a network it has been excluded
from.
Onboarding: WIN-DHCP is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 79).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=dhcp where sourcename='WIN-DHCP' and action='IP_LEASE_DENIED'
| duration 1h
| groupby macaddress, resultcode
Detects a Box account accessed from a source address with no prior history, followed
by substantial download activity. The combination is far stronger than either signal
alone: a new location by itself is routine for mobile users, and downloads by
themselves are routine for everyone.
Onboarding: BOX is ingested via Box native connector (Bloo extractor 711).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/box-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='BOX' and action='DOWNLOADED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 25
by substantial download activity. The combination is far stronger than either signal
alone: a new location by itself is routine for mobile users, and downloads by
themselves are routine for everyone.
Onboarding: BOX is ingested via Box native connector (Bloo extractor 711).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/box-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='BOX' and action='DOWNLOADED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 25
Detects a privileged database login brokered through Arcon ARCOS from a source
address without prior history. ARCOS sits in front of database administrative access,
so it observes privileged DB sessions that database-native auditing often misses
entirely.
The extractor exposes a deliberately narrow field set — user, source address and
authentication protocol — so this detection is intentionally simple.
Onboarding: ARCOS-DBEVT is ingested via RDBMS Log Shipper (Bloo extractor 225).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='ARCOS-DBEVT' and action='LOGIN'
| groupby user, srcip, authproto
address without prior history. ARCOS sits in front of database administrative access,
so it observes privileged DB sessions that database-native auditing often misses
entirely.
The extractor exposes a deliberately narrow field set — user, source address and
authentication protocol — so this detection is intentionally simple.
Onboarding: ARCOS-DBEVT is ingested via RDBMS Log Shipper (Bloo extractor 225).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='ARCOS-DBEVT' and action='LOGIN'
| groupby user, srcip, authproto
Detects process execution reported by a Smokescreen decoy. A decoy runs no business
workload, so any process beyond the platform's own agent indicates an intruder has
reached the asset and is executing code on it.
Capture the command line in full: on a decoy it is uncontaminated by legitimate
activity and gives a clean view of attacker tooling and intent.
Onboarding: SMOKESCREEN is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 206).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='SMOKESCREEN' and action='THREAT_DETECTED'
and process != ''
| groupby process, commandline, user, srcip
workload, so any process beyond the platform's own agent indicates an intruder has
reached the asset and is executing code on it.
Capture the command line in full: on a decoy it is uncontaminated by legitimate
activity and gives a clean view of attacker tooling and intent.
Onboarding: SMOKESCREEN is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 206).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='SMOKESCREEN' and action='THREAT_DETECTED'
and process != ''
| groupby process, commandline, user, srcip
Detects an endpoint repeatedly failing compliance evaluation. Persistent failure
means either a device nobody is maintaining, or one where a control is being actively
disabled and re-detected — security software stopped, patches removed, agent
tampered with.
Onboarding: FORESCOUT is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 247).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=compliance where sourcename='FORESCOUT' and action='COMPLIANCE_CHECK'
| duration 24h
| groupby user, policy, reason
means either a device nobody is maintaining, or one where a control is being actively
disabled and re-detected — security software stopped, patches removed, agent
tampered with.
Onboarding: FORESCOUT is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 247).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=compliance where sourcename='FORESCOUT' and action='COMPLIANCE_CHECK'
| duration 24h
| groupby user, policy, reason
Detects one MAC address obtaining an unusual number of distinct leases. Legitimate
devices hold a lease and renew it. Rapid cycling suggests either MAC spoofing or a
device deliberately churning addresses to frustrate tracking and evade controls bound
to an IP.
Onboarding: WIN-DHCP is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 79).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=dhcp where sourcename='WIN-DHCP' and action='IP_LEASED'
| duration 1h
| groupby macaddress
| select macaddress, distinct_count(srcip)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 5
devices hold a lease and renew it. Rapid cycling suggests either MAC spoofing or a
device deliberately churning addresses to frustrate tracking and evade controls bound
to an IP.
Onboarding: WIN-DHCP is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 79).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=dhcp where sourcename='WIN-DHCP' and action='IP_LEASED'
| duration 1h
| groupby macaddress
| select macaddress, distinct_count(srcip)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 5
Detects a rise in dropped or suppressed mail. Transport rules that silently discard
messages can be used to hide security alerts, suppress notifications of account
changes, or conceal an ongoing compromise from the people who would otherwise notice
it.
Mail that never arrives generates no complaint for some time, which is precisely why
this is worth watching.
Onboarding: MS-EXCHANGE is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 142).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='MS-EXCHANGE'
and action in ('EMAIL_DROPPED', 'EMAIL_SUPPRESSED')
| duration 1h
| groupby recipient, sender, direction
messages can be used to hide security alerts, suppress notifications of account
changes, or conceal an ongoing compromise from the people who would otherwise notice
it.
Mail that never arrives generates no complaint for some time, which is precisely why
this is worth watching.
Onboarding: MS-EXCHANGE is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 142).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='MS-EXCHANGE'
and action in ('EMAIL_DROPPED', 'EMAIL_SUPPRESSED')
| duration 1h
| groupby recipient, sender, direction
Detects access to files hosted on a decoy share. Decoy shares carry inviting names and
plausible content but hold nothing real and are linked from nowhere, so a file open is
deliberate discovery rather than a user stumbling into the wrong folder.
Which file was opened is itself intelligence: it indicates what the intruder is
looking for, and that shapes where you look next in the real estate.
Onboarding: SMOKESCREEN is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 206).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='SMOKESCREEN' and action='THREAT_DETECTED'
and file != ''
| groupby file, user, srcip
plausible content but hold nothing real and are linked from nowhere, so a file open is
deliberate discovery rather than a user stumbling into the wrong folder.
Which file was opened is itself intelligence: it indicates what the intruder is
looking for, and that shapes where you look next in the real estate.
Onboarding: SMOKESCREEN is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 206).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='SMOKESCREEN' and action='THREAT_DETECTED'
and file != ''
| groupby file, user, srcip
Detects configuration changes to the PAM platform itself. Vault configuration governs
who may retrieve which credentials and what is recorded; altering it is how an
attacker grants themselves durable privileged access while suppressing the evidence
of having done so.
Changes made by an account that does not normally administer the vault are the ones
worth escalating.
Onboarding: PAM360 is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 879).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=configuration where sourcename='PAM360' and action='CONFIGURATION_CHANGED'
| groupby user, config, srcip, role
who may retrieve which credentials and what is recorded; altering it is how an
attacker grants themselves durable privileged access while suppressing the evidence
of having done so.
Changes made by an account that does not normally administer the vault are the ones
worth escalating.
Onboarding: PAM360 is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 879).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=configuration where sourcename='PAM360' and action='CONFIGURATION_CHANGED'
| groupby user, config, srcip, role
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