Siddhant Mishra
@SiddhantMumbaiCompletionist
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159 detections
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Detects repository creation or addition to an organisation. Attackers use new
repositories as staging ground for exfiltrated data, as hosting for second-stage
payloads under a trusted domain, or as a place to park stolen source.
Pair with the creating identity: a repository created by an account that has never
created one before is the interesting case.
Onboarding: GITHUB is ingested via GitHub connector (Bloo extractor 870).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/github-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=github where sourcename='GITHUB'
and action in ('REPOSITORY_CREATED', 'REPOSITORY_ADDED')
| groupby target, repositoryid, newrepositoryadded, organisationid
repositories as staging ground for exfiltrated data, as hosting for second-stage
payloads under a trusted domain, or as a place to park stolen source.
Pair with the creating identity: a repository created by an account that has never
created one before is the interesting case.
Onboarding: GITHUB is ingested via GitHub connector (Bloo extractor 870).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/github-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=github where sourcename='GITHUB'
and action in ('REPOSITORY_CREATED', 'REPOSITORY_ADDED')
| groupby target, repositoryid, newrepositoryadded, organisationid
Detects connections held open far longer than normal. Interactive command and
control, tunnelling and remote access tooling all maintain long sessions, whereas
ordinary application traffic is short-lived and bursty.
Duration is available directly in the connection record, which makes this far
cheaper to evaluate than reconstructing sessions from flow data.
Onboarding: NTA is ingested via Network Traffic Analysis (Bloo extractor 717).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=nta-connection where sourcename='NTA'
and action='CONNECTION_ESTABLISHED'
| duration 24h
| groupby srcip, dstip, dstport, app, duration
control, tunnelling and remote access tooling all maintain long sessions, whereas
ordinary application traffic is short-lived and bursty.
Duration is available directly in the connection record, which makes this far
cheaper to evaluate than reconstructing sessions from flow data.
Onboarding: NTA is ingested via Network Traffic Analysis (Bloo extractor 717).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=nta-connection where sourcename='NTA'
and action='CONNECTION_ESTABLISHED'
| duration 24h
| groupby srcip, dstip, dstport, app, duration
Detects threats identified by Mimecast where the same sender appears repeatedly.
A single blocked message is routine; the same origin returning again and again is a
campaign specifically targeting this organisation, and the repetition is the signal
worth acting on rather than the individual block.
Onboarding: MIMECAST is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 161).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/mimecast-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='MIMECAST' and action='THREAT_DETECTED'
| duration 24h
| groupby sender, srcip
| select sender, srcip, distinct_count(recipient)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 5
A single blocked message is routine; the same origin returning again and again is a
campaign specifically targeting this organisation, and the repetition is the signal
worth acting on rather than the individual block.
Onboarding: MIMECAST is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 161).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/mimecast-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='MIMECAST' and action='THREAT_DETECTED'
| duration 24h
| groupby sender, srcip
| select sender, srcip, distinct_count(recipient)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 5
Detects a privileged session beginning with no preceding credential retrieval by the
same account. The expected sequence is checkout then session. A session without one
suggests the credential was obtained outside the vault — cached, shared, or stolen —
which defeats the control the vault exists to provide.
Correlate SESSION_STARTED in the audit stream against PASSWORD_RETRIEVED in the iam
stream for the same user within a preceding window.
Onboarding: PAM360 is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 879).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=audit where sourcename='PAM360' and action='SESSION_STARTED'
| groupby user, targetuser, srcip, devicetype
same account. The expected sequence is checkout then session. A session without one
suggests the credential was obtained outside the vault — cached, shared, or stolen —
which defeats the control the vault exists to provide.
Correlate SESSION_STARTED in the audit stream against PASSWORD_RETRIEVED in the iam
stream for the same user within a preceding window.
Onboarding: PAM360 is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 879).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=audit where sourcename='PAM360' and action='SESSION_STARTED'
| groupby user, targetuser, srcip, devicetype
Detects a host generating an unusual rate of failed DNS resolutions. A high NXDOMAIN
rate is the signature of a client searching for something that mostly does not exist
— DGA malware hunting for its live controller, or tooling enumerating subdomains.
This complements the DGA detection: entropy catches the shape of the names, NXDOMAIN
rate catches the behaviour regardless of how the names look.
Onboarding: INFOBLOX is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 155).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=dns where sourcename='INFOBLOX' and action='DNS_QUERIED'
and lower(responsecode) like '%nxdomain%'
| duration 10m
| groupby srcip
| select srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 50
rate is the signature of a client searching for something that mostly does not exist
— DGA malware hunting for its live controller, or tooling enumerating subdomains.
This complements the DGA detection: entropy catches the shape of the names, NXDOMAIN
rate catches the behaviour regardless of how the names look.
Onboarding: INFOBLOX is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 155).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=dns where sourcename='INFOBLOX' and action='DNS_QUERIED'
and lower(responsecode) like '%nxdomain%'
| duration 10m
| groupby srcip
| select srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 50
Detects a burst of uploads to Box from a single account. Where mass download suggests
theft from the platform, a mass upload suggests the platform is being used as the
staging point — data collected elsewhere in the estate being moved into cloud storage
the attacker controls or can reach from outside.
Onboarding: BOX is ingested via Box native connector (Bloo extractor 711).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/box-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='BOX' and action='UPLOADED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 40
theft from the platform, a mass upload suggests the platform is being used as the
staging point — data collected elsewhere in the estate being moved into cloud storage
the attacker controls or can reach from outside.
Onboarding: BOX is ingested via Box native connector (Bloo extractor 711).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/box-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='BOX' and action='UPLOADED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 40
Detects a new agent account in Zendesk. An agent can read customer conversations and
correspond with customers under the organisation's name — which makes an
unauthorised agent account both a data exposure and a channel for defrauding the
organisation's own customers.
Onboarding: ZENDESK is ingested via NXLog (Bloo extractor 831).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/zendesk-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='ZENDESK' and action='USER_ADDED'
| groupby user, targetuser, role
correspond with customers under the organisation's name — which makes an
unauthorised agent account both a data exposure and a channel for defrauding the
organisation's own customers.
Onboarding: ZENDESK is ingested via NXLog (Bloo extractor 831).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/zendesk-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='ZENDESK' and action='USER_ADDED'
| groupby user, targetuser, role
Detects administrative login to the ePO console. An ePO administrator can change
protection policy, create exclusions and push software to every managed endpoint —
which makes this account one of the highest-value targets in any estate running it.
Onboarding: TRELLIX-EPO is ingested via RDBMS Log Shipper (Bloo extractor 857).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='TRELLIX-EPO' and action='LOGIN'
| groupby user, srcip, authproto
protection policy, create exclusions and push software to every managed endpoint —
which makes this account one of the highest-value targets in any estate running it.
Onboarding: TRELLIX-EPO is ingested via RDBMS Log Shipper (Bloo extractor 857).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='TRELLIX-EPO' and action='LOGIN'
| groupby user, srcip, authproto
Detects mail redirection on Zimbra Collaboration. Zimbra is widely deployed in
government, education and smaller enterprises, has been the subject of repeated
mass-exploitation campaigns, and is rarely covered by commercial detection content —
the combination makes it a persistent soft target.
Redirection is the standard persistence on a compromised mailbox: it survives
password resets and quietly copies correspondence onward.
Onboarding: ZIMBRA is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 123).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='ZIMBRA' and action='EMAIL_REDIRECTED'
| groupby sender, recipient, direction, remoteip, subject
government, education and smaller enterprises, has been the subject of repeated
mass-exploitation campaigns, and is rarely covered by commercial detection content —
the combination makes it a persistent soft target.
Redirection is the standard persistence on a compromised mailbox: it survives
password resets and quietly copies correspondence onward.
Onboarding: ZIMBRA is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 123).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='ZIMBRA' and action='EMAIL_REDIRECTED'
| groupby sender, recipient, direction, remoteip, subject
Detects deletion of content within Zendesk. Removing attachments or tickets destroys
the record of a support interaction, which is how a social engineering attempt that
succeeded gets erased before anyone reviews how the attacker obtained what they did.
Onboarding: ZENDESK is ingested via NXLog (Bloo extractor 831).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/zendesk-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='ZENDESK' and action='DELETED'
| groupby user, file, srcip, visibility
the record of a support interaction, which is how a social engineering attempt that
succeeded gets erased before anyone reviews how the attacker obtained what they did.
Onboarding: ZENDESK is ingested via NXLog (Bloo extractor 831).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/zendesk-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='ZENDESK' and action='DELETED'
| groupby user, file, srcip, visibility
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