Siddhant Mishra
@SiddhantMumbaiCompletionist
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159 detections
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Detects creation of an Atlassian API token. Tokens authenticate without a password
and without multi-factor, and they persist until revoked — which makes token creation
one of the most durable persistence mechanisms available on a SaaS platform holding
an organisation's project and documentation estate.
Onboarding: ATLASSIAN is ingested via NXLog (Bloo extractor 832).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/atlassian-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='ATLASSIAN' and action='API_TOKEN_CREATED'
| groupby user, targetuser, sitename, domain
and without multi-factor, and they persist until revoked — which makes token creation
one of the most durable persistence mechanisms available on a SaaS platform holding
an organisation's project and documentation estate.
Onboarding: ATLASSIAN is ingested via NXLog (Bloo extractor 832).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/atlassian-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='ATLASSIAN' and action='API_TOKEN_CREATED'
| groupby user, targetuser, sitename, domain
Detects a threat raised by Versa Networks on a zero trust session. Versa sits at the
branch edge, so it observes traffic from sites that frequently have no local
security stack at all — in many estates it is the only sensor between a remote
office and the internet.
Onboarding: VERSA-NETWORKS is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 806).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='VERSA-NETWORKS' and action='THREAT_DETECTED'
| groupby user, srcip, dstip, threat, process
branch edge, so it observes traffic from sites that frequently have no local
security stack at all — in many estates it is the only sensor between a remote
office and the internet.
Onboarding: VERSA-NETWORKS is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 806).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='VERSA-NETWORKS' and action='THREAT_DETECTED'
| groupby user, srcip, dstip, threat, process
Detects a privileged command run through Centrify on Linux. Because elevation is
brokered, the platform records what was actually executed under elevated rights —
a cleaner record of privileged activity than shell history, which the user can edit.
Onboarding: CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-LINUX is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 822).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-LINUX'
and action='USER_COMMAND_EXECUTED'
| groupby user, targetuser, role, domain
brokered, the platform records what was actually executed under elevated rights —
a cleaner record of privileged activity than shell history, which the user can edit.
Onboarding: CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-LINUX is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 822).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-LINUX'
and action='USER_COMMAND_EXECUTED'
| groupby user, targetuser, role, domain
Detects a privilege change within an Atlassian site. Confluence and Jira hold
architecture documentation, runbooks, credentials pasted into tickets and project
plans — so a privilege escalation here is a documentation-estate compromise, which
typically precedes a far more targeted attack elsewhere.
Onboarding: ATLASSIAN is ingested via NXLog (Bloo extractor 832).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/atlassian-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='ATLASSIAN' and action='PRIVILEGE_CHANGED'
| groupby user, targetuser, role, group, sitename
architecture documentation, runbooks, credentials pasted into tickets and project
plans — so a privilege escalation here is a documentation-estate compromise, which
typically precedes a far more targeted attack elsewhere.
Onboarding: ATLASSIAN is ingested via NXLog (Bloo extractor 832).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/atlassian-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='ATLASSIAN' and action='PRIVILEGE_CHANGED'
| groupby user, targetuser, role, group, sitename
Detects quarantined messages being released at volume. Release overrides the
gateway's own verdict, so a burst of releases either reflects a false positive wave
or an attacker with administrative access letting their own delivery through the
control that stopped it.
Onboarding: MIMECAST is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 161).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/mimecast-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='MIMECAST' and action='EMAIL_QUARANTINED'
| duration 1h
| groupby sender, recipient, direction
gateway's own verdict, so a burst of releases either reflects a false positive wave
or an attacker with administrative access letting their own delivery through the
control that stopped it.
Onboarding: MIMECAST is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 161).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/mimecast-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='MIMECAST' and action='EMAIL_QUARANTINED'
| duration 1h
| groupby sender, recipient, direction
Detects an invitation into a GitHub organisation. Membership confers access to
private source and, depending on role, the ability to alter it. An unexpected
invitation is a supply chain risk: the attacker does not need to breach anything if
somebody adds them to the organisation.
Onboarding: GITHUB is ingested via GitHub connector (Bloo extractor 870).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/github-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='GITHUB' and action='MEMBER_INVITED'
| groupby target, role, organisationid, accesstype
private source and, depending on role, the ability to alter it. An unexpected
invitation is a supply chain risk: the attacker does not need to breach anything if
somebody adds them to the organisation.
Onboarding: GITHUB is ingested via GitHub connector (Bloo extractor 870).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/github-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='GITHUB' and action='MEMBER_INVITED'
| groupby target, role, organisationid, accesstype
Detects deletion of a role in Centrify for Windows. Removing a role can strip access
from legitimate administrators during an incident, and it also erases the record of
who was entitled to what — which complicates reconstructing the access position
afterwards.
Onboarding: CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-WINDOWS is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 821).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-WINDOWS' and action='ROLE_DELETED'
| groupby user, role, targetuser, domain
from legitimate administrators during an incident, and it also erases the record of
who was entitled to what — which complicates reconstructing the access position
afterwards.
Onboarding: CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-WINDOWS is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 821).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-WINDOWS' and action='ROLE_DELETED'
| groupby user, role, targetuser, domain
Detects a secret being revealed in the Secret Server interface. Launching a session
uses a credential without exposing it; displaying it puts the plaintext in front of
a human, where it can be copied, photographed or written down and used outside every
control the vault provides.
Display is materially more serious than use, and the two are worth separating.
Onboarding: SECRET-SERVER is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 844).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=secretserver-secret where sourcename='SECRET-SERVER'
and action='PASSWORD_DISPLAYED'
| groupby user, file, filetype, srcip
uses a credential without exposing it; displaying it puts the plaintext in front of
a human, where it can be copied, photographed or written down and used outside every
control the vault provides.
Display is materially more serious than use, and the two are worth separating.
Onboarding: SECRET-SERVER is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 844).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=secretserver-secret where sourcename='SECRET-SERVER'
and action='PASSWORD_DISPLAYED'
| groupby user, file, filetype, srcip
Detects VNC and remote framebuffer sessions, including the authentication method
negotiated. RFB is frequently deployed without strong authentication on industrial
and legacy systems, and an attacker finding one has interactive desktop access to a
machine that often cannot run an endpoint agent at all.
Onboarding: NTA is ingested via Network Traffic Analysis (Bloo extractor 717).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=nta-authentication-rfb where sourcename='NTA'
| groupby srcip, dstip, dstport, authmethod
negotiated. RFB is frequently deployed without strong authentication on industrial
and legacy systems, and an attacker finding one has interactive desktop access to a
machine that often cannot run an endpoint agent at all.
Onboarding: NTA is ingested via Network Traffic Analysis (Bloo extractor 717).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=nta-authentication-rfb where sourcename='NTA'
| groupby srcip, dstip, dstport, authmethod
Detects a burst of user deactivations in a Slack workspace. Mass deactivation locks
colleagues out of the channel an organisation uses to coordinate its own incident
response, which is both disruptive in itself and a way of blinding the responders
while something else proceeds.
Onboarding: SLACK is ingested via Slack native connector (Bloo extractor 833).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations/slack
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='SLACK' and action='USER_DEACTIVATED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user
| select user, distinct_count(targetuser)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 5
colleagues out of the channel an organisation uses to coordinate its own incident
response, which is both disruptive in itself and a way of blinding the responders
while something else proceeds.
Onboarding: SLACK is ingested via Slack native connector (Bloo extractor 833).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations/slack
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='SLACK' and action='USER_DEACTIVATED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user
| select user, distinct_count(targetuser)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 5
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