Splunk Security
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2,497 detections
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This detection identifies an Active Directory access-control list (ACL) modification event, which applies the minimum required extended rights to perform the DCShadow attack. Specifically, it looks for modifications to the domainDNS object where specific GUIDs related to 'Add/Remove Replica In Domain', 'Manage Replication Topology', and 'Replication Synchronization' are added to the ACL. These permissions are necessary for an attacker to register a rogue domain controller and perform a DCShadow attack.
The analytic detects the creation of files containing passwords, cookies, and saved login account information by the Braodo stealer malware in temporary folders. Braodo often collects these credentials from browsers and applications, storing them in temp directories before exfiltration. This detection focuses on monitoring for the creation of files with patterns or formats commonly associated with stolen credentials. By identifying these activities, security teams can take needed action to prevent sensitive login data from being leaked, reducing the risk of unauthorized access to user accounts and systems.
The analytic identifies the creation or modification of Image File Execution Options (IFEO) registry keys, detected via EventCode 3000 in the Application channel. This detection leverages Windows Event Logs to monitor for process names added to IFEO under specific registry paths. This activity is significant as it can indicate attempts to set traps for process monitoring or debugging, often used by attackers for persistence or evasion. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code or manipulate process behavior, leading to potential system compromise.
This analytic detects the use of the Get-ADComputer cmdlet with parameters indicating a search for Windows endpoints with Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify this specific activity. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt by adversaries or Red Teams to gain situational awareness and perform Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to identify high-value targets for further exploitation, potentially leading to privilege escalation or lateral movement within the network.
The analytic detects modifications in the Windows registry by the Applocker utility that deny the execution of various security products. This detection leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel, focusing on specific registry paths and values indicating a "Deny" action against known antivirus and security software. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to disable security defenses, a tactic observed in malware like Azorult. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to bypass security measures, facilitating further malicious activities and persistence within the environment.
This analytic detects modifications to privileged groups in Active Directory, including creation, deletion, and changes to various types of groups such as local, global, universal, and LDAP query groups. It specifically monitors for changes to high-privilege groups like "Administrators", "Domain Admins", "Enterprise Admins", and "ESX Admins", among others. This detection is particularly relevant in the context of potential exploitation of vulnerabilities like the VMware ESXi Active Directory Integration Authentication Bypass (CVE-2024-37085), where attackers may attempt to manipulate privileged groups to gain unauthorized access to systems.
The analytic detects modifications to Windows Proxy settings via registry keys, specifically focusing on the path `*\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\PortProxy\v4tov4\tcp*`. This activity is significant because `netsh.exe` can be used to establish a persistent proxy, potentially allowing an attacker to execute a helper DLL whenever `netsh.exe` runs. This could enable persistence, network configuration manipulation, data exfiltration, or further system compromise.
This analytic detects an unusual number of NTLM authentication attempts by a single user account against multiple distinct destinations. This behavior is indicative of an attacker performing brute-force attacks, password spraying, or other NTLM-based authentication attacks to gain access to numerous domain-joined Windows devices. Such activity may also generate a high volume of Event ID 4776 events.
Detection rule generated by AI system
The following analytic identifies unauthorized devices attempting to connect to the organization's network by inspecting DHCP request packets. It detects this activity by comparing the MAC addresses in DHCP requests against a list of known authorized devices stored in the assets_by_str.csv file. This activity is significant for a SOC because unauthorized devices can pose security risks, including potential data breaches or network disruptions. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to gain unauthorized network access, potentially leading to further exploitation or data exfiltration.
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