Splunk Security
@SplunkSecurity35 followers31,483 downloads1,579 copies11 likes89,226 views
2,497 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
2,497
Categories
829
523
264
239
208
Platforms
1,607
256
203
142
100
Products / Services
1,226
896
791
217
212
MITRE Techniques
932
661
510
495
306
CVEs
18
12
11
10
9
This analytic is looking for when an ACL is applied to an OU which denies listing the objects residing in the OU. This activity combined with modifying the owner of the OU will hide AD objects even from domain administrators.
The analytic identifies attempts to bypass AppLocker application restrictions by monitoring specific Windows AppLocker event codes (8007, 8004, 8022, 8025, 8029, 8040). These event codes indicate block events where an application was prevented from running due to AppLocker policies. The rule focuses on instances where five or more such attempts occur from the same source, which could suggest an attacker trying to escalate privileges or execute unauthorized code on the system. It extracts details such as the host, full file path, and target user associated with the bypass attempt.
The following analytic identifies processes querying the registry for potential passwords or credentials. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions that access specific registry paths known to store sensitive information. This activity is significant as it may indicate credential theft attempts, often used by adversaries or post-exploitation tools like winPEAS. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to privilege escalation, persistence, or lateral movement within the network, posing a severe security risk.
The following analytic identifies when a Windows Defender ASR rule disabled events. ASR is a feature of Windows Defender Exploit Guard that prevents actions and apps that are typically used by exploit-seeking malware to infect machines. ASR rules are applied to processes and applications. When a process or application attempts to perform an action that is blocked by an ASR rule, an event is generated. This detection searches for ASR rule disabled events that are generated when an ASR rule is disabled.
The following analytic detects a suspicious registry modification that disables the Lock Computer feature in Windows. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the registry path "*\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\DisableLockWorkstation" with a value of "0x00000001". This activity is significant because it prevents users from locking their screens, a tactic often used by malware, including ransomware, to maintain control over compromised systems. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to sustain their presence and execute further malicious actions without user interruption.
The following analytic detects the usage of wevtutil.exe with the "clear-log" parameter in order to clear the contents of logs. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because clearing event logs can be an attempt to cover tracks after malicious actions, hindering forensic investigations. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to erase evidence of their activities, making it difficult to trace their actions and understand the full scope of the compromise.
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes with abnormally large padding (50 or more spaces) in the command line. This specific pattern is a key indicator of the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability exploitation, where threat actors craft malicious LNK files containing padded content to trigger code execution. The excessive spacing in the command line is used to manipulate the way Windows processes the shortcut file, enabling arbitrary code execution. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks, with malicious LNK files being delivered through both HTTP and SMB protocols. The presence of significant command line padding when Explorer.exe launches command shells is highly suspicious and warrants immediate investigation.
The following analytic detects the execution of the `Find-LocalAdminAccess` cmdlet using PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This cmdlet is part of PowerView, a toolkit for Windows domain enumeration. Identifying the use of `Find-LocalAdminAccess` is crucial as adversaries may use it to find machines where the current user has local administrator access, facilitating lateral movement or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to target and compromise additional systems within the network, significantly increasing their control and access to sensitive information.
The following analytic identifies the execution of `net.exe` with command-line arguments used to query global, local and domain groups. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to enumerate local or domain groups, which is a common step in Active Directory or privileged accounts discovery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to gain insights into the domain structure, aiding in further attacks such as privilege escalation or lateral movement.
This analytic detects an increase in modifications to AD user objects. A large volume of changes to user objects can indicate potential security risks, such as unauthorized access attempts, impairing defences or establishing persistence. By monitoring AD logs for unusual modification patterns, this detection helps identify suspicious behavior that could compromise the integrity and security of the AD environment.
Page 173 of 250