Yamato Security Hayabusa

@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
23 followers164,250 downloads303 copies5 likes55,514 views

4,504 detections

Detects the use of the "SET" internal command of Cmd.EXE with the /p flag followed directly by an "=" sign.
Attackers used this technique along with an append redirection operator ">>" in order to update the content of a file indirectly.
Ex: cmd /c >> example.txt set /p="test data". This will append "test data" to contents of "example.txt".
The typical use case of the "set /p=" command is to prompt the user for input.
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
006
Detects the execution of a renamed instance of the Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tool, MeshAgent.
RMM tools such as MeshAgent are commonly utilized by IT administrators for legitimate remote support and system management.
However, malicious actors may exploit these tools by renaming them to bypass detection mechanisms, enabling unauthorized access and control over compromised systems.
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
006
Detects the execution of certutil with certain flags that allow the utility to download files from file-sharing websites.
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
006
Detects certificate creation with template allowing risk permission subject
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
avatar
Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
2079
Detects an executable initiating a network connection to "ngrok" tunneling domains.
Attackers were seen using this "ngrok" in order to store their second stage payloads and malware.
While communication with such domains can be legitimate, often times is a sign of either data exfiltration by malicious actors or additional download.
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
avatar
Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
0066
Detects PowerShell scripts to set the ACL to a file in the Windows folder
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
5064
Detects possible addition of shadow credentials to an active directory object.
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
3063
Detects the loading of the "taskschd.dll" module from a process that located in a potentially suspicious or uncommon directory.
The loading of this DLL might indicate that the application have the capability to create a scheduled task via the "Schedule.Service" COM object.
Investigation of the loading application and its behavior is required to determining if its malicious.
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
005
Detects potential COM object hijacking via modification of default system CLSID.
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
avatar
Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
005
Detects attackers using tooling with bad opsec defaults.
E.g. spawning a sacrificial process to inject a capability into the process without taking into account how the process is normally run.
One trivial example of this is using rundll32.exe without arguments as a sacrificial process (default in CS, now highlighted by c2lint), running WerFault without arguments (Kraken - credit am0nsec), and other examples.
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
avatar
Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
005
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