Ethan Andrews
@eandrewsTrusted contributorCompletionist
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1,181 detections
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Detects the legitimate Notepad++ updater process (GUP.exe) spawning suspicious child processes. This behavior was observed during the Notepad++ supply chain attack where the updater was used to launch malicious payloads. The rule specifically looks for GUP.exe as the parent process and child processes with filenames like 'update.exe', 'install.exe', 'AutoUpdater.exe', 'curl.exe', or 'cmd.exe'.
Detects a rapid, repeated termination of known security tool processes within a short time frame. This behavior is indicative of an "EDR killer" malware attempting to disable security controls in a continuous loop.
Detects the execution of automated Nginx configuration modification scripts by identifying the use of 'csplit', 'awk', or 'sed' in close proximity to Nginx service management commands (reload, restart, or testing). This pattern is a hallmark of the 'bt.sh', 'zdh.sh', and '4zdh.sh' toolkits used to inject malicious proxy_pass directives.
Detects the creation of a Windows kernel-mode driver service where the driver binary is located in a suspicious, non-standard directory like Temp, Public, or AppData. This is a common persistence technique for malware, including EDR killers that use vulnerable drivers.
Detects the use of curl.exe to upload files to the temp.sh service while simultaneously passing the resulting temp.sh URL within the User-Agent string to a C2 server. This specific exfiltration and beaconing TTP was observed in the Notepad++ supply chain attack.
Detects a sequence of reconnaissance commands (whoami, tasklist, systeminfo, netstat) executed by the command prompt and piped to a text file. This specific TTP was used in the Notepad++ supply chain attack to gather system information for exfiltration.
This rule detects logon events from Windows Admin Center (WAC) virtual accounts where the associated user principal name (UPN) belongs to an external or unknown tenant. This activity is a key indicator of compromise for CVE-2026-20965, where an attacker uses a forged token from an external tenant to gain unauthorized access.
Detects the execution of a JScript file by cscript.exe using a legacy NTFS 8.3 shortname format. This is a specific behavior observed in Gootloader's persistence mechanism, where a .LNK file in the Startup folder executes a second-stage script.
Detects when a legitimate application, such as pdf24.exe, loads 'cryptbase.dll' from a non-standard directory. This is a known DLL side-loading technique used by the PDFSIDER malware.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with command-line arguments containing keywords indicative of in-memory download and execution, such as '-enc' or '-EncodedCommand' used in conjunction with 'IEX' (Invoke-Expression) or 'DownloadString'. This pattern is a common TTP for initial access and second-stage payload delivery, and was observed in the exploitation of CVE-2025-55182 (React2Shell).
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