Ethan Andrews
@eandrewsTrusted contributorCompletionist
13 followers311 downloads7,465 copies113 likes78,082 views
1,181 detections
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Detects recurring kernel panic or oops events on KVM hosts occurring in rapid succession, typically within a 5-minute window. This behavioral pattern is consistent with an attacker repeatedly exploiting a race condition, such as a use-after-free (UAF) in the KVM shadow MMU, to trigger a persistent host denial-of-service.
Detects command-line execution (cmd, powershell, bash, curl, etc.) spawned by SmarterMail, Langflow, or Laravel (Livewire) application processes. This pattern is indicative of remote code execution exploitation, such as CVE-2025-52691 (SmarterMail), CVE-2025-34291 (Langflow), or CVE-2025-54068 (Laravel Livewire), often used to download secondary payloads or perform post-exploitation activity.
Detects the execution of Java processes with a -jar argument where the JAR file is located in a non-standard, user-writable directory (e.g., Temp, Downloads) and the process is initiated by an unexpected parent application (e.g., shell, explorer). This pattern is indicative of the execution of QuimaRAT or similar Java-based malware.
Detects Python scripts or processes accessing browser 'Local State' files and subsequently invoking decryption routines like DPAPI's CryptUnprotectData or NSS's PK11SDR_Decrypt. This behavior is indicative of credential theft activity where malware, such as BusySnake Stealer, attempts to decrypt stored browser credentials for exfiltration.
Detects the installation and service creation of the Nezha agent, a monitoring tool often abused by threat actors to establish persistent backdoors on compromised systems.
Detects Active Directory Federation Services (ADFS) token issuance or claims processing events (Event IDs 299, 1200-1203) that lack a corresponding preceding primary authentication audit event within the same correlation instance. This lack of correlation suggests the SAML assertion was not initiated by a legitimate login, potentially indicating the use of a forged SAML token (Golden SAML attack).
Detects the use of administrative utilities (takeown, icacls, del) to modify permissions on and subsequently delete critical Windows boot files (winload.exe, winload.efi, ntoskrnl.exe, bootmgr). This activity is associated with GigaWiper and is intended to render the target operating system unbootable.
Detects the use of legitimate Windows tools, bcdedit.exe and reagentc.exe, to disable system recovery mechanisms (boot status policies and the Windows Recovery Environment). This activity is often observed during destructive wiper attacks to prevent system restoration after data destruction.
Detects a Node.js process termination followed by a quick respawn of a new Node.js process by the same parent process. This pattern suggests a watchdog persistence mechanism where the parent process monitors the child, automatically restarting it if it is terminated, consistent with behaviors observed in malware such as Void Dokkaebi.
Detects suspicious PowerShell execution patterns involving dynamic command reconstruction using [char[]] character arrays and the iex (Invoke-Expression) cmdlet, or the use of specific base64 EncodedCommand prefixes associated with known obfuscation tools like Banana RAT.
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