Ethan Andrews
@eandrewsTrusted contributorCompletionist
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1,181 detections
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Detects the execution of PowerShell with flags designed to bypass execution policies (-NoProfile, -NonInteractive, -ExecutionPolicy Unrestricted) originating from the ScreenConnect SystemTemp directory. This behavior is consistent with malicious campaigns, such as those deploying AsyncRAT via trojanized installers, that utilize the ScreenConnect temporary storage path to stage and execute secondary malicious payloads.
Detects execution of potential BeepRAT loaders such as tcc.exe, luajit.exe, or hfy.exe that exhibit evasive behavior by loading amsi.dll. This activity is indicative of in-memory shellcode execution attempting to disable security features like AMSI, ETW, or WLDP before loading malicious payloads.
Detects DLL side-loading activity associated with the Kazuar backdoor, where legitimate executables (LaunchGFExperience.exe or vncutil64.exe) are executed from unusual directories (Brother Printer or Sony Audio drivers) to load a malicious DLL (LaunchGFExperienceLOC.dll).
Detects Microsoft 365 OAuth access tokens issued via device_code grant — the mechanism abused by the EvilTokens phishing kit — followed within 1 hour by mailbox forwarding rule creation for the same account, indicating persistent BEC access post-compromise.
Detects the execution of scripting interpreters and remote management tools originating from the SimpleHelp RMM process tree. This activity is indicative of post-exploitation abuse where an attacker, having hijacked a technician session (e.g., via CVE-2026-48558 OIDC bypass), uses the RMM console to execute commands on remote endpoints.
Detects unauthorized access to sensitive developer artifacts, including Git credentials, GitHub CLI configurations, GitHub Desktop logs, and VS Code global storage files by suspicious processes (Node.js, Python, or VS Code executables) commonly leveraged in the 'Contagious Interview' campaign associated with the Lazarus Group for credential theft.
Detects Microsoft Device Code grant type authentications in Entra ID sign-in logs, consistent with the EvilTokens phishing kit abusing the OAuth device code flow to steal tokens without capturing passwords. Flags DeviceCode protocol sign-ins from browser-based clients, which is atypical for legitimate device code usage.
Detects SSH client processes linked to libssh2 (such as ssh, curl, sftp, scp) exhibiting sustained high CPU usage (>=95%) for more than 60 seconds while maintaining an active outbound SSH connection. This behavior is consistent with the denial-of-service vulnerability CVE-2026-55199, where an attacker-controlled SSH server provides an excessively large extension count during the key exchange process, triggering an infinite loop within the libssh2 library.
Detects instances where WinRAR.exe is observed writing potentially malicious script or link files (.hta, .vbs, .js, .ps1, .lnk) into the Windows Startup folder. This pattern is indicative of exploitation of CVE-2025-8088, a path traversal vulnerability in WinRAR often leveraged by the Gamaredon group to establish persistence.
Detects a Python loader process spawned by VS Code or Node.js environments that exhibits suspicious network activity indicative of fetching the InvisibleFerret infostealer, correlated with the installation of Python dependencies via 'pip' within a 10-minute window. This behavior is associated with the Lazarus Group 'Contagious Interview' campaign.
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