Kaung Khant Ko
@kaungkhantkoTrusted contributorCompletionist
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410 detections
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This rule detects potential adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) activity targeting FortiGate firewalls, specifically looking for internal authentication traffic (LDAP, Kerberos, LDAPS, MS-SQL) originating from a firewall management IP. The rule triggers if there are 5 such connections within 60 seconds, indicating a possible listening post or attempt to intercept credentials.
Detects network connections from non-browser processes executing from the ProgramData directory to known dead-drop resolver forums (digitalpoint.com, letsdiskuss.com) used by Lorem Ipsum for C2 resolution. This rule specifically targets the Rapid Brigantine threat.
This rule detects the execution of potentially malicious commands launched directly from the Windows File Explorer address bar. By analyzing DeviceProcessEvents, it identifies when explorer.exe spawns common command-line utilities (powershell.exe, cmd.exe, etc.) with arguments often associated with malicious activity, such as remote script downloads, encoded commands, or bypass flags.
This rule detects suspicious processes (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe, curl.exe) or the execution of vaultcmd.exe accessing browser credential files (Login Data, Web Data, logins.json, key4.db) or utilizing DPAPI (CryptUnprotectData) to extract stored credentials. This behavior is indicative of credential harvesting often observed in infostealer campaigns.
This rule detects high-volume HTTP POST requests to the FortiGate SSL VPN logincheck URI, specifically '/remote/logincheck', over common HTTPS ports (443, 4433, 8443, 9443, 10443). It uses a threshold of 5 requests from the same source IP within 30 seconds to identify potential credential stuffing or password spraying attacks against FortiGate devices, often associated with the 'FortiBleed' campaign.
Detects suspicious image loads where a renamed Microsoft .NET ClickOnce Launch Utility or other .NET masquerading binaries sideload mscoree.dll or msvcp140.dll from the ProgramData directory. This behavior is associated with the Lorem Ipsum threat activity.
Detects registry run key additions that masquerade as the legitimate .NET Runtime Optimization Service. This behavior is used by the Lorem Ipsum loader (associated with Rapid Brigantine) to establish persistence by executing a payload dropped in C:\ProgramData\ upon user login.
This rule detects the use of common command-line utilities such as curl, certutil, and PowerShell to download files from a specific external domain ('thomphon.com') or to download a file named 'update.msi'. These activities are often associated with the staging of malicious payloads.
Detects persistence mechanisms associated with ModeloRAT, specifically monitoring for suspicious Registry Run key entries, scheduled tasks, and startup folder items that execute 'pythonw.exe' or 'WPy64-31401' based binaries.
Detects the use of common Windows living-off-the-land binaries (certutil, bitsadmin, curl, powershell) to download external files, which is a common behavior associated with staging malware loaders such as MintsLoader and D3F@ck Loader.
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