Kaung Khant Ko
@kaungkhantkoTrusted contributorCompletionist
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410 detections
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Detects highly obfuscated PowerShell command lines that utilize various encoding and execution techniques, often indicative of malicious activity. The rule scores different obfuscation methods (XOR, Hex, Base64), execution methods (ScriptBlock, IEX), and payload indicators (URLs, download functions). A high total score and specific thresholds for execution and obfuscation trigger the alert. It also considers suspicious parent processes like browsers or scripting hosts.
Detects the creation or modification of 'endpointdlp.dll' and 'data.bin' files on disk, which are key indicators of the MLTBackdoor infection chain prior to DLL sideloading. This rule focuses on the initial staging of these malicious components.
Detects the staging of the Lucid Stealer hidden self-copy loader and the SQLite CLI helper binary in the Temp directory. This rule specifically looks for file creation events in the user's Temp directory with filenames matching patterns associated with Lucid Stealer's staging activities: 'winupd_*.exe' for its self-copy loader and '_sq3e_*.exe' for its SQLite helper.
Detects executions of specific renamed binaries (Genuine.exe, Updater.exe, AutoCAD242.exe) or the original Toolbox.exe utilizing the '-uiDll' flag. This is indicative of DLL side-loading behavior abused by OceanLotus to deploy the SPECTRALVIPER backdoor.
Detects the creation of specific staging archives and log files used by Lucid Stealer before exfiltration. This rule looks for 'uac.log.txt', 'lucid_err.log', or 'Data_*.zip' files being created in the user's local temporary directory.
Detects privilege escalation attempts utilizing PowerShell's Start-Process cmdlet with the 'RunAs' verb. This technique can be used by malware like Lucid Stealer's UAC module to elevate privileges.
Identifies the creation of '.node' payload modules by Lucid Stealer in the Common AppData folder, indicative of the SEA payload staging its remote control and theft modules. This rule specifically looks for file creation events where the file name ends with '.node' and the folder path matches a pattern under the user's local AppData 'Common' folder.
Detects network connections to the primary C2 domain (fruitbrat.com) used by the Mustang Panda PlugX variant in this campaign. Specifically flags HTTPS connections to this domain.
Detects network traffic matching the specific HTTP GET request URI used by the OceanLotus SPECTRALVIPER backdoor for command and control beaconing.
Detects process injection attempts targeting the OneDrive.Sync.Service.exe process. This behavior is associated with the OceanLotus SPECTRALVIPER backdoor, which uses it to maintain persistence and evade defense mechanisms.
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