Kaung Khant Ko
@kaungkhantkoTrusted contributorCompletionist
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410 detections
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Detects instances where the legitimate Windows Character Map utility (charmap.exe) is spawned by suspicious processes or PowerShell, and subsequently loads clr.dll. This behavior is indicative of potential DLL sideloading or process injection techniques used by malware to execute arbitrary code within a trusted system process context.
Detects the execution of AutoIt-related processes from temporary directories that are attempting to load or execute suspicious .ini configuration files or specifically named executables, which is a common delivery mechanism for malware such as AsyncRAT.
This rule detects potential persistence mechanisms where a suspicious batch file (.bat) is placed within the Windows Startup folder and subsequently executed using command-line arguments that include specific file extensions like .exe and .ini. This behavior is indicative of malware, such as remote access trojans (RATs), attempting to maintain persistence upon system reboot.
Detects the execution of a potentially malicious, renamed AutoIT interpreter from a temporary directory, where the process command line or associated file activity involves a specific, obfuscated loader script (kojuyn.ini). The rule identifies behavioral patterns consistent with malware staging and execution, including the use of random filenames for both the interpreter and the script, characteristic of loaders using custom string deobfuscation and decryption routines.
This rule detects network activity associated with the PlugX RAT, specifically monitoring for DNS lookups of 'images.hcgtest.net', direct IP connections to '104.21.77.221', and HTTP requests to '/download/ar96rhqjgw2' using a user-agent containing 'curl'. This pattern indicates a compromised host attempting to download a PlugX archive.
Detects potential DLL side-loading attempts involving GlobalProtect VPN components. The rule identifies the execution of GlobalProtect.exe with specific command-line arguments combined with the presence of suspicious versions of bcrypt.dll or WININET.dll within the same directory, which are characteristic of recent malicious activity involving modified DLL files targeting GlobalProtect environments.
This rule detects potentially malicious process execution chains where VBScript or unknown/suspicious binaries (such as ProfileQuickHost.exe) are used to launch Node.js processes, specifically targeting JavaScript files or VBScript agents. This pattern is often associated with the execution of remote access trojans (RATs) or custom malware loaders.
Detects high-frequency file creation, opening, or modification events within the Windows AppData Local Temp directory. This behavior, often involving specific obfuscated file names or known malicious process names, is a common indicator of malware payload staging or execution patterns, such as those observed in AsyncRAT infections.
Detects the execution of PowerShell scripts located in the user's temporary folder. The detection logic looks for common obfuscation flags such as WindowStyle Hidden, NoProfile, and NoLogo, combined with the -File argument, which are frequently used by droppers and malicious payloads to execute scripts in the background while evading immediate user observation.
This rule detects PowerShell commands that utilize specific character array joining techniques (e.g., [char]nnnn -join '') often used to obfuscate malicious strings or bypass keyword-based security filters. This is a common tactic for evading detection when downloading or executing payloads.
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