SigmaHQ Detections
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This rule detects interactive console logons (LogonType 2) to server systems and domain controllers. It specifically looks for successful (EventID 528, 4624) and failed (EventID 529, 4625) interactive logon attempts. The rule filters out events where the logon process name is 'Advapi' and the computer is a workstation, aiming to reduce false positives from legitimate workstation activities.
This rule identifies suspicious usage of the AWS Security Token Service (STS) `AssumeRole` API call. Specifically, it looks for instances where the `userIdentity.type` is `AssumedRole` and the `userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.type` is `Role`. This pattern indicates that an AWS role is being assumed by another role, which could be a legitimate administrative action but also a technique used by attackers for lateral movement and privilege escalation within an AWS environment. Attackers might use `AssumeRole` to switch to roles with higher privileges or to move between different accounts or services after gaining initial access.
Detects when a temporary access pass (TAP) is added to an account in Azure AD. TAPs are a passwordless authentication method that can be used for onboarding, recovery, or as a strong credential. The addition of a TAP, especially to privileged accounts, should be investigated as it could indicate an attempt to gain or maintain unauthorized access.
Detects usage of the Windows RPC library Encrypting File System Remote Protocol (MS-EFSRPC). Variations of this RPC are used within the attack referred to as PetitPotam. The usage of this RPC function should be rare if ever used at all. Thus, any usage of this function is uncommon enough that it should warrant further investigation to determine if it is legitimate. View surrounding logs (within a few minutes before and after) from the Source IP to determine if it is legitimate. Logs from the Source IP would include dce_rpc, smb_mapping, smb_files, rdp, ntlm, kerberos, etc.
Detects the creation of remote scheduled tasks by monitoring access to the 'atsvc' named pipe over SMB. This activity is indicative of using tools like 'at.exe' or direct API calls to schedule tasks on a remote system, which can be leveraged for privilege escalation, execution, lateral movement, or persistence.
This rule detects suspicious child processes spawned by 'msra.exe' (Microsoft Remote Assistance). Adversaries have been observed using msra.exe for process injection, discovery, and persistence. The rule specifically looks for common command-line utilities being executed as child processes of msra.exe, which could indicate malicious activity.
This rule detects when Privileged Identity Management (PIM) alerts are disabled within Azure. Disabling PIM alerts can be a defense evasion tactic, as it prevents security teams from being notified of critical activities related to privileged roles, potentially allowing an attacker to operate undetected after gaining initial access or escalating privileges.
This rule detects attempts to enable auditing of TTY input on Linux systems by monitoring modifications to PAM (Pluggable Authentication Modules) configuration files. Specifically, it looks for changes to '/etc/pam.d/system-auth' and '/etc/pam.d/password-auth' in conjunction with TTY-related audit events. This activity could indicate an adversary attempting to implement keylogging functionality using the pam_tty_audit module to capture user input.
This rule detects successful remote logons by users whose usernames start with 'Admin' (e.g., Administrator, Admin-SQL) on Windows systems. It specifically looks for Event ID 4624 (successful logon), Logon Type 10 (RemoteInteractive), and the Negotiate authentication package. The rule aims to identify potential misuse of administrative accounts for remote access, which could indicate privilege escalation, persistence, or lateral movement. Its effectiveness relies on an internal pattern for administrator usernames and a policy mandating that these accounts are only used as secondary accounts.
Detects when a modification (create, update, replace, delete, or patch) action is taken that affects mutating or validating webhook configurations in Kubernetes. Adversaries can abuse these configurations to achieve persistence, exfiltrate credentials, or escalate privileges within the cluster.
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