SigmaHQ Detections
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6,797 detections
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Detects when failed sign-in attempts increase by 10% or greater within Azure AD. This could indicate brute-force attacks, password spraying, or attempts to gain unauthorized access to accounts.
Detects when successful authentications to important applications occur using only single-factor authentication. This could indicate a weakened security posture for critical resources or a bypass of expected multi-factor authentication policies.
Detects the creation of files named "ebpfbackdoor" within the "cron.d" and "sudoers.d" directories. This activity is associated with the TripleCross eBPF rootkit, which uses these locations for persistence.
Detects the creation of a new Windows service where the client process or its parent process has a Process ID (PID) of 0. A PID of 0 typically indicates the System Idle Process, which should not be initiating service installations. This behavior can be indicative of highly privileged malware or rootkits attempting to establish persistence or escalate privileges by creating services in an unusual context.
Detects Code Integrity (CI) engine blocking Microsoft Defender's processes (MpCmdRun and NisSrv) from loading unsigned DLLs. This activity may indicate an attempt to sideload arbitrary DLLs into legitimate Microsoft Defender processes, potentially for privilege escalation, persistence, or defense evasion.
Detects the creation of a macro file for Outlook, specifically 'VbaProject.OTM', which can be used for persistence or to execute malicious code when Outlook is launched.
Detects potential data exfiltration activity associated with the 'Shai-Hulud' NPM package attack. This rule specifically looks for the execution of 'curl' with command-line arguments indicating data being sent ('-d') to a known malicious webhook.site URL.
This rule detects activity associated with the OilRig APT group, as detailed in Nyotron's March 2018 report. Specifically, it looks for the creation of a scheduled task named 'SC Scheduled Scan' that executes 'autoit3.exe' from a specific path, execution of executables within a '
Windows\Temp\DB\' directory, execution of 'C:\Windows\system32\Service.exe' with specific command-line arguments, and 'autoit3.exe' spawning 'nslookup.exe' with DNS TXT query parameters. These indicators collectively point to persistence mechanisms, execution of malicious payloads, and DNS-based command and control used by OilRig.
Windows\Temp\DB\' directory, execution of 'C:\Windows\system32\Service.exe' with specific command-line arguments, and 'autoit3.exe' spawning 'nslookup.exe' with DNS TXT query parameters. These indicators collectively point to persistence mechanisms, execution of malicious payloads, and DNS-based command and control used by OilRig.
Detects the creation of specific files associated with the Pingback backdoor, which is known to establish an ICMP tunnel for command and control (C2) communications. The rule specifically looks for 'updata.exe' being created and 'C:\Windows\oci.dll' as the target filename, as described in the Trustwave report.
Detects post-exploitation execution technique of the Serpent backdoor. This involves creating a temporary scheduled task using an unusual method: creating a fictitious Windows event and a trigger that executes a payload once the event is created. The detection specifically looks for command-line arguments indicative of this behavior when executed by cmd.exe or powershell.exe.
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