avatar

SigmaHQ Detections

@sigmaHQ
12 followers122,432 downloads2,507 copies16 likes159,711 views

6,797 detections

This rule detects attempts to write or modify files within the `C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\` or `C:\Windows\SysWow64\Tasks\` directories using common command-line utilities. Adversaries may leverage the globally writable nature of these folders to achieve privilege escalation, persistence, or defense evasion by loading custom assemblies or scripts into legitimate Windows processes like cscript, wscript, regsvr32, mshta, or eventvwr.
avatar
SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
avatar
SigmaHQ
1 year ago
0014
Detects the execution of Sysinternals PsSuspend, a utility that can be used to suspend running processes. This tool can be abused by adversaries to halt critical security processes or other applications, potentially for evasion or to facilitate further malicious activity.
avatar
SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
avatar
SigmaHQ
1 year ago
0014
This rule detects the creation of an ActiveScriptEventConsumer via the `wmic.exe` command-line utility. Adversaries often use WMI event subscriptions to establish persistence or elevate privileges by executing malicious code when a specific event occurs. The presence of 'ActiveScriptEventConsumer' and 'CREATE' in the command line indicates an attempt to set up such a subscription.
avatar
SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
avatar
SigmaHQ
1 year ago
0014
Detects potential COM object hijacking attempts by monitoring the creation of 'TreatAs' subkeys within the HKU (HKEY_USERS) hive. Adversaries can manipulate the Windows Component Object Model (COM) registry structure to redirect legitimate COM object calls to malicious code, achieving persistence or privilege escalation. This rule specifically looks for the creation of a 'TreatAs' subkey under a CLSID (Class ID) entry, which is a known method for COM hijacking. The rule filters out creations by 'svchost.exe' to reduce false positives, as svchost can legitimately create such keys.
avatar
SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
avatar
SigmaHQ
1 year ago
0014
Detects the presence of a registry key created during Azorult malware execution. Specifically, it looks for modifications to registry keys ending with '\services\localNETService' within the 'SYSTEM\' hive, which is a known indicator for Azorult.
avatar
SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
avatar
SigmaHQ
1 year ago
0014
This rule detects attempts to establish persistence or escalate privileges by abusing the Windows 10 Narrator's Feedback-Hub. Specifically, it looks for the deletion of the 'DelegateExecute' value or modification of the '(Default)' value within a specific registry key associated with the Feedback-Hub application. This technique can be used by an attacker to inject a malicious payload that will execute when the Narrator's Feedback-Hub is launched.
avatar
SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
avatar
SigmaHQ
1 year ago
0014
Detects potential malicious modification of the 'Run' registry key by malware identified as 'winekey' or 'team9' (Bazar/KEGTAP) to establish persistence. Specifically, it looks for modifications to the 'Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Backup Mgr' registry value.
avatar
SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
avatar
SigmaHQ
1 year ago
0014
Detects modifications to the 'HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\HTMLHelp\data' registry key, which is associated with the RedMimicry Winnti playbook. This registry key can be used for persistence or defense evasion by adversaries.
avatar
SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
avatar
SigmaHQ
1 year ago
0014
Detects attempts to establish persistence by modifying registry keys associated with the Recycle Bin. This technique leverages the Recycle Bin's CLSID to execute arbitrary commands, often for privilege escalation or maintaining access.
avatar
SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
avatar
SigmaHQ
1 year ago
3014
Detects modifications to Internet Explorer's autostart extensibility points (ASEPs) in the Windows Registry. Adversaries may modify these registry keys to establish persistence or elevate privileges by ensuring malicious code executes when Internet Explorer starts or when a user logs in.
avatar
SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
avatar
SigmaHQ
1 year ago
0014
Page 240 of 680