SigmaHQ Detections
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This rule detects the installation of Visual Studio Code Tunnel (code-tunnel) as a Windows service. Adversaries may use legitimate tools like VS Code Tunnel for command and control (C2) to establish persistent communication channels that blend in with normal network traffic, making detection more difficult. The detection logic specifically looks for command-line arguments indicative of service installation, including 'tunnel', 'service', 'internal-run', and 'tunnel-service.log'.
Detects when files are transferred using the ScreenConnect Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tool. This activity can indicate an adversary using legitimate tools for data exfiltration or staging.
Detects the creation of an "lsass.dmp" file by the taskmgr process. This indicates a manual dumping of the LSASS.exe process memory using Windows Task Manager, a common technique for credential access.
This rule detects DNS queries to specific domains identified as indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the Diamond Sleet APT group. The domains '3dkit.org', 'dersmarketim.com', 'galerielamy.com', and 'olidhealth.com' are known to be used by this threat actor for command and control (C2) communications. Monitoring for these specific DNS queries can help identify systems potentially compromised by Diamond Sleet.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task in the Windows Registry that is specifically associated with the Diamond Sleet APT group. This activity is linked to their exploitation of the TeamCity CVE-2023-42793 vulnerability, where they create a scheduled task named 'Windows TeamCity Settings User Interface' to establish persistence or execute malicious code.
Detects the creation of hidden files or folders by appending the "::$index_allocation" stream to their names. This technique can be used by adversaries to prevent standard tools like Windows Explorer or PowerShell from accessing or listing these hidden artifacts, thereby evading detection and hindering forensic analysis.
Detects the creation of a file named "code_tunnel.json" when the creating process is not a legitimate Visual Studio Code executable. This indicates potential execution and usage of the VsCode tunneling utility by an unauthorized or renamed process, which could be used for command and control.
Detects the creation of a local user account named "DarkGate" with the username "SafeMode" using the `net.exe` or `net1.exe` command-line utility. This specific pattern is associated with DarkGate malware activity.
Detects the redirection of discovery command output by the Ursnif malware. Specifically, it looks for `cmd.exe` processes spawned by `explorer.exe` that execute a command with `/C ` and redirect its output to a `.bin` file in the `AppData\local\temp\` directory.
Detects the creation of specific files in the ProgramData directory, which are known indicators of compromise associated with the Diamond Sleet APT group. These files include executables, DLLs, and other data files used in their attack campaigns.
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