SigmaHQ Detections
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This rule detects when a DNS server receives a zone transfer request for a non-existent or non-authoritative zone, indicated by EventID 6004 from the Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Server-Service. This event signifies an attempt to perform a DNS zone transfer that was rejected by the DNS server. Such attempts can be part of reconnaissance activities by adversaries trying to map out a network's DNS infrastructure.
This rule detects the installation of the 'HybridConnectionManager' service on a Windows system. This service is part of Azure Hybrid Connection Manager, which allows Azure services to connect to on-premises resources. While legitimate, its installation could also be leveraged by an attacker to establish persistence or facilitate data exfiltration from an compromised environment to Azure resources.
This rule detects the execution of PsExec or PAExec by monitoring network share access to the IPC$ share. Specifically, it looks for access to named pipes ending with '-stdin', '-stdout', or '-stderr', which are characteristic of PsExec/PAExec communication. The rule filters out instances where the service name starts with 'PSEXESVC', indicating the standard Sysinternals PsExec service, to reduce false positives for legitimate PsExec usage or when the attacker uses a different PsExec client.
Detects a threat actor creating a file named `wbemcomn.dll` in the `C:\Windows\System32\wbem\` directory over the network for a WMI DLL Hijack scenario. This is identified by monitoring Windows Security Event ID 5145 for file creations ending with `\wbem\wbemcomn.dll` and filtering out legitimate system accounts (those ending with '$').
Detects the installation of a service by the smbexec.py tool, identified by a specific service name ('BTOBTO') and characteristic command-line arguments in the ImagePath, which typically involve executing a batch script and redirecting output.
Detects the creation of a service named 'ZzNetSvc' which is associated with the Moriya rootkit, as described in the 'Operation TunnelSnake' report by Securelist. This rule specifically looks for Event ID 7045 from the 'Service Control Manager' provider, indicating a service installation.
Detects when adversaries delete important scheduled tasks related to system restore, Windows Defender, BitLocker, Windows Backup, Windows Update, Update Orchestrator, or Exploit Guard. This activity could indicate an attempt to disrupt system services or processes, potentially as a precursor to data destructive activities or to hinder defensive capabilities.
Detects cases where ngrok, a legitimate reverse proxy tool, is used to forward traffic to the local Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) port. This activity can indicate malicious behavior, as adversaries often use tools like ngrok for command and control, bypassing firewalls, or establishing persistent remote access to compromised systems.
Detects password dumper activity by monitoring remote thread creation (EventID 8) where the target process is 'lsass.exe'. The process initiating the remote thread is the malicious program. A single execution of such a tool can generate numerous events.
This rule detects the deletion of prefetch files, which are used by Windows to speed up application launch times. Adversaries may delete these files to remove forensic evidence of their activities, making it harder to determine what applications were executed on a compromised system. The rule specifically looks for files ending with '.pf' within the ':\Windows\Prefetch\' directory. A filter is applied to exclude deletions performed by 'svchost.exe' with 'AUTHORI' or 'AUTORI' in the user field, as these are often legitimate system activities.
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