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SigmaHQ Detections

@sigmaHQ
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6,797 detections

Detects a potential privilege escalation attempt by monitoring the creation of specific ".Exe.Local" folders within the "System32" directory. This technique is used to sideload "comctl32.dll" into legitimate Windows processes, which can lead to privilege escalation or persistence.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
0016
Detects a threat actor creating a file named `wbemcomn.dll` in the `C:\Windows\System32\wbem\` directory over the network, which is a known technique for WMI DLL Hijacking. This specific scenario involves the `System` process, indicating a potential remote write operation followed by the system attempting to load the malicious DLL.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
0016
Detects `rundll32.exe` loading a renamed `comsvcs.dll` to dump process memory, which is a common technique for credential dumping, specifically targeting LSASS. The rule looks for `rundll32.exe` executions where the loaded image is NOT the legitimate `comsvcs.dll` (implying a renamed or malicious version).
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
1016
Detects when the 'outlvba.dll' (Microsoft VBA for Outlook Addin) is loaded by the 'outlook.exe' process. This activity can indicate the use of VBA macros within Outlook, which can be leveraged for persistence or execution by adversaries.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
0016
Detects programs that connect to known malware callback ports based on statistical analysis from two different sandbox system databases. This rule identifies outbound network connections to a specific list of destination ports that have been historically associated with malware command and control (C2) communications. It filters out connections to local IP ranges and common system directories to reduce false positives.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
0016
This rule detects outbound network connections to destination ports 8080 or 8888 that are not within common local IP ranges or initiated by programs in standard system directories. This aims to identify potentially malicious command and control (C2) activity or data exfiltration using non-standard ports.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
0016
This rule detects the creation of named pipes with specific naming conventions commonly used by Cobalt Strike. Cobalt Strike is a legitimate penetration testing tool that is frequently misused by threat actors for post-exploitation activities. The rule looks for pipe names containing "\MSSE-" and "-server", or starting with "\postex_", "\status_", "\msagent_", "\mojo_", "\interprocess_", "\samr_", "\netlogon_", "\srvsvc_", "\lsarpc_", or "\wkssvc_". These patterns are indicative of Cobalt Strike's beacon communication or other internal operations.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
0016
Detects keywords within PowerShell module logs that indicate an attempt to clear PowerShell history. This includes commands like 'Remove-Item' or 'del' targeting the history file path, or 'Set-PSReadlineOption' to disable history saving.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
0016
Detects the creation of a PowerShell module where the module contents specifically include "function Get-VMRemoteFXPhysicalVideoAdapter". This pattern is indicative of potential abuse of the "RemoteFXvGPUDisablement.exe" binary, which is known to be vulnerable to module load-order hijacking. An attacker might use this technique to execute arbitrary code by tricking the legitimate signed binary into loading a malicious PowerShell module.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
0016
This rule detects PowerShell script blocks that utilize the `System.DirectoryServices.DirectorySearcher` object to enumerate Active Directory for computer objects. Specifically, it looks for the creation of this object, the addition of properties to load (like 'name'), and the execution of `findall()` to retrieve results. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to discover domain-joined computers within an Active Directory environment.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
0016
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