Arnold Chan
@slazTrusted contributorCompletionist
2 followers2,099 downloads4,333 copies51 likes25,880 views
7,555 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
5,650
1,006
394
169
98
Categories
2,356
1,807
1,233
1,013
924
Platforms
4,191
1,622
1,250
676
676
Products / Services
2,820
1,003
991
720
485
MITRE Techniques
2,087
1,520
1,413
1,070
536
CVEs
38
33
24
22
21
IDS Classtypes
477
179
104
79
52
IDS Protocols
554
156
144
86
18
Detects behavior consistent with the Kothamine agent, where a recently dropped DLL in a temporary directory is loaded by a short-lived explorer.exe process. This rule monitors for file creation, subsequent module loading by the explorer process, and ensures the process was spawned in close proximity to the file activity, indicating likely process injection.
Detects the Kothamine UAC-bypass technique, which uses fodhelper.exe to spawn an elevated PowerShell process. The rule monitors for fodhelper.exe being launched without arguments (a common indicator of this bypass) followed immediately by an elevated PowerShell process containing indicators like 'elevated.ps1' or 'TailscalePortable' paths.
Detects the Kothamine UAC-bypass technique, which uses fodhelper.exe to spawn an elevated PowerShell process. The rule monitors for fodhelper.exe being launched without arguments (a common indicator of this bypass) followed immediately by an elevated PowerShell process containing indicators like 'elevated.ps1' or 'TailscalePortable' paths.
Detects anomalous credential access behavior by identifying instances where a compromised explorer.exe process (injected with the Kothamine payload DLL MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.dll) accesses browser cookie stores and gaming credential files in quick succession.
Detects anomalous file manipulation behavior consistent with the Kothamine agent, characterized by rapid create, write, and delete cycles on a single file. The detection specifically targets processes identified as either explorer.exe with a reflected Kothamine DLL module or the standalone MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.exe loader running from an AppData staging path.
Detects anomalous file manipulation behavior consistent with the Kothamine agent, characterized by rapid create, write, and delete cycles on a single file. The detection specifically targets processes identified as either explorer.exe with a reflected Kothamine DLL module or the standalone MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.exe loader running from an AppData staging path.
Detects unauthorized access to Windows camera or microphone consent store registry keys by either a suspected Kothamine agent masquerading as 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.exe' or an injected 'explorer.exe'. The rule correlates these registry access events with the presence of specific Kothamine-related file artifacts (MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.dll and tailcat.exe) on the same host within a 24-hour window to minimize noise.
Detects unauthorized access to Windows camera or microphone consent store registry keys by either a suspected Kothamine agent masquerading as 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.exe' or an injected 'explorer.exe'. The rule correlates these registry access events with the presence of specific Kothamine-related file artifacts (MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.dll and tailcat.exe) on the same host within a 24-hour window to minimize noise.
Detects the initialization and persistence of a 'tailcat.exe' process operating from a non-standard, user-profile directory, typically mimicking legitimate tools. The rule monitors for the specific 'forward' command-line argument containing port mapping strings, an immediate loopback connection to that port, and subsequent periodic external network keep-alive traffic originating from the same process or parent lineage, indicating a C2 tunnel setup.
Hunts telemetry for published NeedyMantis indicators: three known SHA-256 hashes (WinSparkle.dll first-stage loader and its encrypted archive, plus the older libcurl archive), the C2 domain corp.tripswithengine[.]com, and the C2 URL path /library/zip/ on that domain. Domain/URL matching parses the actual host out of RemoteUrl and requires an EXACT match (not substring 'has/contains'), so a different domain that merely contains 'corp.tripswithengine.com' as a suffix of a longer label (e.g. 'notcorp.tripswithengine.com') or as a prefix of an unrelated domain (e.g. 'corp.tripswithengine.com.evil.net') cannot match. No malicious IP address has been published for this campaign, so IP-based matching is intentionally not included.
Page 104 of 756