Arnold Chan
@slazTrusted contributorCompletionist
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This rule performs a retrospective sweep for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the DragonForce TURN/MQTT campaign, as detailed in Lab52 threat research. It monitors for file and process activity matching known malicious hashes, as well as network connections to specific domains and URLs associated with the campaign's command-and-control infrastructure.
Detects specific markers in UDP traffic on ports 3478, 5349, and 443 that are associated with the DragonForce malware's TRN1 C2 beaconing protocol. The rules identify session initiation, task polling, task acknowledgment, and result uploading behaviors.
Detects a multi-stage process execution chain involving PowerShell: first, a script-based download of remote content, followed by in-memory reflection, and finally, suspicious memory allocation or thread manipulation within the same process context. This pattern is characteristic of fileless malware execution chains designed to evade disk-based detection.
Detects a multi-stage process execution chain involving PowerShell: first, a script-based download of remote content, followed by in-memory reflection, and finally, suspicious memory allocation or thread manipulation within the same process context. This pattern is characteristic of fileless malware execution chains designed to evade disk-based detection.
Detects a multi-stage process execution chain involving PowerShell: first, a script-based download of remote content, followed by in-memory reflection, and finally, suspicious memory allocation or thread manipulation within the same process context. This pattern is characteristic of fileless malware execution chains designed to evade disk-based detection.
Matches distinctive DragonForce TURN/MQTT campaign artifact filenames only when combined with byte-level markers unique to the malware (PE structure, TURN/MQTT C2 infrastructure strings, or the loader's pipe-caret-pipe thread-trigger byte pattern), to avoid false positives on unrelated benign files sharing these names.
Matches distinctive DragonForce TURN/MQTT campaign artifact filenames only when combined with byte-level markers unique to the malware (PE structure, TURN/MQTT C2 infrastructure strings, or the loader's pipe-caret-pipe thread-trigger byte pattern), to avoid false positives on unrelated benign files sharing these names.
This rule detects anomalous GET requests to PHP files within the WordPress themes directory that match the specific pattern used by the DragonForce threat actor for secondary C2 beaconing. The detection identifies requests that lack typical WordPress request indicators like cookies or specific form fields, suggesting non-browser, programmatically generated C2 traffic.
Detects anomalous execution of PowerShell commands spawned by processes identified as 'javaw.exe' or 'GlobalTellurSync.exe' (associated with DragonForce backdoor activity). The detection focuses on instances where these processes launch from non-standard user-writable directories (e.g., AppData, Temp) and execute PowerShell commands that contain obfuscated arguments or payloads, while excluding standard scheduled task invocations.
Detects anomalous execution of PowerShell commands spawned by processes identified as 'javaw.exe' or 'GlobalTellurSync.exe' (associated with DragonForce backdoor activity). The detection focuses on instances where these processes launch from non-standard user-writable directories (e.g., AppData, Temp) and execute PowerShell commands that contain obfuscated arguments or payloads, while excluding standard scheduled task invocations.
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