Arnold Chan
@slazTrusted contributorCompletionist
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Detects the 2CLoader malware dropping and executing a payload from user-writable directories such as Temp or Downloads. The rule identifies suspicious process lineage by checking for a parent-process spoofing scenario where the reported parent is explorer.exe, but the actual initiator is a different process, excluding common legitimate installer filenames to reduce noise.
Detects the 2CLoader malware dropping and executing a payload from user-writable directories such as Temp or Downloads. The rule identifies suspicious process lineage by checking for a parent-process spoofing scenario where the reported parent is explorer.exe, but the actual initiator is a different process, excluding common legitimate installer filenames to reduce noise.
Detects the 2CLoader malware dropping and executing a payload from user-writable directories such as Temp or Downloads. The rule identifies suspicious process lineage by checking for a parent-process spoofing scenario where the reported parent is explorer.exe, but the actual initiator is a different process, excluding common legitimate installer filenames to reduce noise.
Detects the 2CLoader malware dropping and executing a payload from user-writable directories such as Temp or Downloads. The rule identifies suspicious process lineage by checking for a parent-process spoofing scenario where the reported parent is explorer.exe, but the actual initiator is a different process, excluding common legitimate installer filenames to reduce noise.
Detects persistence attempts using common Windows auto-start registry keys or scheduled tasks where the initiating process is unsigned or has an invalid signature. The rule focuses on binaries executing from suspicious, user-writable directories (e.g., Temp, AppData, Downloads) and specifically targets persistence mechanisms involving the 'SecurityHealthService.exe' filename.
Detects persistence attempts using common Windows auto-start registry keys or scheduled tasks where the initiating process is unsigned or has an invalid signature. The rule focuses on binaries executing from suspicious, user-writable directories (e.g., Temp, AppData, Downloads) and specifically targets persistence mechanisms involving the 'SecurityHealthService.exe' filename.
Detects persistence attempts using common Windows auto-start registry keys or scheduled tasks where the initiating process is unsigned or has an invalid signature. The rule focuses on binaries executing from suspicious, user-writable directories (e.g., Temp, AppData, Downloads) and specifically targets persistence mechanisms involving the 'SecurityHealthService.exe' filename.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests destined for 'aware-cr1.com' targeting the URI '/api/beacon', which is indicative of command-and-control (C2) communication associated with the 2CLoader malware.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests destined for 'aware-cr1.com' targeting the URI '/api/beacon', which is indicative of command-and-control (C2) communication associated with the 2CLoader malware.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests destined for 'aware-cr1.com' targeting the URI '/api/beacon', which is indicative of command-and-control (C2) communication associated with the 2CLoader malware.
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