Arnold Chan
@slazTrusted contributorCompletionist
2 followers2,099 downloads4,355 copies51 likes25,957 views
7,555 detections
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Detects anomalous behavioral patterns where an AI agent process (e.g., Claude Code, Cursor, Aider) performs multi-category discovery of its own runtime environment, plugins, and host configuration. The rule identifies agents that trigger processes spanning at least three distinct discovery categories (Network, File/Plugin, Software, or System) within a short timeframe, indicating potential reconnaissance of agent-authorized capabilities and tools rather than standard host exploration. Covers T1082, T1518, T1083, T1016
Detects mshta.exe spawning suspicious child processes (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or reg.exe) that are characteristic of the ReverseRAT backdoor. The rule identifies common discovery commands or persistence attempts via Registry Run keys triggered from mshta.exe.
Detects the modification of AI agent configuration files (e.g., mcp.json, config.json) followed shortly by the agent spawning a child process that matches typical Model Context Protocol (MCP) server execution patterns. This behavior may indicate an attacker has modified the configuration to inject malicious server commands or tools that the AI agent will execute upon next initialization, effectively achieving persistent code execution via the agent's legitimate functionality.
Detects instances where AI developer tools or IDE assistants (e.g., Claude, Copilot, Cursor) execute data collection commands (such as directory traversal or archiving) followed by or concurrent with the bulk access of sensitive files (credentials, configuration files) or personal user data.
Detects HTTP requests containing malicious JDBC strings targeting PaperCut NG/MF print management software, which are indicative of attempts to exploit authentication bypass and remote code execution vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-81578, CVE-2026-82078).
This rule monitors network, file, and process telemetry for matches against a predefined list of malicious IP addresses, domain names, and file hashes. It flags suspicious network connections to known C2 infrastructure and the presence or execution of known malicious files based on SHA256 and SHA1 indicators.
IOC hunt across DNS, network, and file-hash telemetry for the Ledger Google Ads phishing campaign. Vercel redirect domains are matched by exact hostname (DNS query name / parsed URL host) rather than substring, eliminating false positives from unrelated strings that merely contain a look-alike domain fragment. GCS bucket and Google Sites path IOCs remain substring-matched since the bucket IDs and page slugs are already highly specific.
Detects clicks on sponsored search engine ads that redirect users to Google Cloud Storage (GCS) buckets with names or paths designed to impersonate the 'Ledger' brand. These artifacts are indicative of a malvertising campaign using typosquatted storage paths to deliver malicious payloads or credential harvesting pages.
Detects clicks on sponsored search engine ads that redirect users to Google Cloud Storage (GCS) buckets with names or paths designed to impersonate the 'Ledger' brand. These artifacts are indicative of a malvertising campaign using typosquatted storage paths to deliver malicious payloads or credential harvesting pages.
Detects network navigation to Google Sites pages that match patterns associated with known Ledger-impersonating phishing campaigns. These sites are often reached through redirect chains involving Google Ads, cloud storage, and rotating domains.
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