Arnold Chan
@slazTrusted contributorCompletionist
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This rule performs a sweep across device file and network events for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the UAT-11587/Antino campaign. It detects malicious file hashes, specific C2 domain connections, and known lure URLs (HTA/WSF) identified by Cisco Talos.
This rule performs a sweep across device file and network events for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the UAT-11587/Antino campaign. It detects malicious file hashes, specific C2 domain connections, and known lure URLs (HTA/WSF) identified by Cisco Talos.
Detects the abuse of the Windows Scripted Diagnostics framework (sdiagnhost.exe) by the Antino threat actor. The attack leverages sdiagnhost.exe to proxy the execution of a malicious script (result.ps1) that subsequently establishes persistence by creating a Registry Run key (GatherOSStateKit). The rule correlates the execution of the scripted diagnostic package with the specific registry modification event within a 5-minute window.
Detects the abuse of the Windows Scripted Diagnostics framework (sdiagnhost.exe) by the Antino threat actor. The attack leverages sdiagnhost.exe to proxy the execution of a malicious script (result.ps1) that subsequently establishes persistence by creating a Registry Run key (GatherOSStateKit). The rule correlates the execution of the scripted diagnostic package with the specific registry modification event within a 5-minute window.
Detects the abuse of the Windows Scripted Diagnostics framework (sdiagnhost.exe) by the Antino threat actor. The attack leverages sdiagnhost.exe to proxy the execution of a malicious script (result.ps1) that subsequently establishes persistence by creating a Registry Run key (GatherOSStateKit). The rule correlates the execution of the scripted diagnostic package with the specific registry modification event within a 5-minute window.
Detects the abuse of the Windows Scripted Diagnostics framework (sdiagnhost.exe) by the Antino threat actor. The attack leverages sdiagnhost.exe to proxy the execution of a malicious script (result.ps1) that subsequently establishes persistence by creating a Registry Run key (GatherOSStateKit). The rule correlates the execution of the scripted diagnostic package with the specific registry modification event within a 5-minute window.
Detects the abuse of the Windows Scripted Diagnostics framework (sdiagnhost.exe) by the Antino threat actor. The attack leverages sdiagnhost.exe to proxy the execution of a malicious script (result.ps1) that subsequently establishes persistence by creating a Registry Run key (GatherOSStateKit). The rule correlates the execution of the scripted diagnostic package with the specific registry modification event within a 5-minute window.
Detects activity associated with the MALFEX npm supply-chain campaign (also known as Overlord/movinlike). This rule performs a sweep for known malicious file hashes, suspicious process command lines, outbound network connections to malicious domains or IPs, and email communications from identified adversary-controlled accounts.
This rule detects potential malicious activity by correlating device events against a known set of malicious file hashes, domains, and URLs. It identifies files with known malicious hashes, network connections to known malicious domains, and command-line processes attempting to download files from known malicious URLs using common living-off-the-land tools like PowerShell, curl, or wget.
This rule detects potential malicious activity by correlating device events against a known set of malicious file hashes, domains, and URLs. It identifies files with known malicious hashes, network connections to known malicious domains, and command-line processes attempting to download files from known malicious URLs using common living-off-the-land tools like PowerShell, curl, or wget.
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