Arnold Chan
@slazTrusted contributorCompletionist
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7,555 detections
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Detects a suspicious sequence of behavior where an Azure service principal authenticates and immediately performs broad reconnaissance (enumeration) across multiple subscriptions and resource types. This pattern is often indicative of an adversary using a compromised service principal credential to map out an environment.
Detects a service principal attempting to delete multiple Azure SQL databases in a short timeframe, resulting in failures. This pattern is characteristic of malicious data destruction activity, such as that observed in Storm-3168 (JADEPUFFER) campaigns, but accounts for the possibility of misconfigured infrastructure-as-code pipelines by requiring a high volume of failed requests across distinct resources.
Detects attempts to delete Azure resource locks protecting Site Recovery or Backup services, followed by credential retrieval (ListKeys) within a one-hour window. This sequence pattern is a strong indicator of an adversary attempting to disable backup protection before potentially destroying data or exfiltrating keys.
This rule detects reconnaissance activity targeting Azure App Service instances, specifically looking for attempts to access web-shell-like files, WordPress administration paths, PHP-CGI endpoints, or LangFlow code validation paths. It identifies potential Storm-3168 actor infrastructure through known IOCs or through patterns of high-volume, path-diverse HTTP requests that deviate from typical noise, helping to distinguish targeted probing from common internet background scanning.
Detects a precursor pattern identified as JADEPUFFER, where a failed 'ListKeys' operation (indicating an attempt to discover or access keys for a non-existent storage account) is immediately followed by a burst of destructive delete operations on critical cloud resources (e.g., storage, databases, key vaults) by the same actor.
Detects anomalous service principal activity characterized by multiple, rapidly issued, and overlapping OAuth tokens within a short time window. This pattern is associated with automated/agentic token orchestration (e.g., JADEPUFFER/Storm-3168 campaign) rather than standard manual operator activity, specifically when leveraging the python-requests user agent.
Detects HTTP GET requests to '/api.php?t=' containing a 13-digit timestamp identifier, followed by a response body containing 'download_link'. This pattern is indicative of the SilverFox malware relaying instructions or stage-two payload delivery.
Detects suspicious process execution patterns associated with RMMCRAT, where the Windows SmartScreen process (smartscreen.exe) spawns cmd.exe, which subsequently launches PowerShell with specific parameters for piped input/output. This behavior is characteristic of malicious code injection and command-and-control activity.
Detects parent process ID (PPID) spoofing associated with RMMCRAT and other HVNC malware, where an injected process (e.g., smartscreen.exe) spawns child processes while spoofing explorer.exe as the parent. The rule monitors for a mismatch between the reported parent (explorer.exe) and the actual creator (smartscreen.exe) and focuses on burst activity of common shell and browser processes.
Detects UNC6240 PSEMHUB.war web shell/tunnel/trojanized installer artifacts by distinctive content markers (x.jsp, u.jsp, tunnel.jsp/jspx, Ple64.exe)
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