Arnold Chan
@slazTrusted contributorCompletionist
2 followers2,099 downloads4,376 copies51 likes26,099 views
7,555 detections
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Detects instances where a non-browser process initiates connections to commercial LLM provider APIs (DeepSeek, OpenRouter, Mistral) followed by a connection to Discord CDN/Webhook endpoints within a 15-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a process acting as an autonomous C2 agent that exfiltrates data after receiving instructions or processing information via an LLM.
Detects instances where a non-browser process initiates connections to commercial LLM provider APIs (DeepSeek, OpenRouter, Mistral) followed by a connection to Discord CDN/Webhook endpoints within a 15-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a process acting as an autonomous C2 agent that exfiltrates data after receiving instructions or processing information via an LLM.
Detects a non-browser process initiating network connections to four distinct commercial LLM API providers (DeepSeek, OpenRouter, Mistral, and Google Gemini) within a 5-minute interval. This behavior is indicative of a C2 pattern where an adversary uses multiple LLM backends to perform plurality-vote or redundant queries, bypassing typical browser-based AI aggregation services.
Detects a non-browser process initiating network connections to four distinct commercial LLM API providers (DeepSeek, OpenRouter, Mistral, and Google Gemini) within a 5-minute interval. This behavior is indicative of a C2 pattern where an adversary uses multiple LLM backends to perform plurality-vote or redundant queries, bypassing typical browser-based AI aggregation services.
Detects malicious shell commands attempting to perform supply-chain persistence via environment variable manipulation in CI/CD environments. The rule identifies processes injecting BASH_ENV into GITHUB_ENV, a known technique used by the SCKIT supply-chain worm to perform credential harvesting during CI pipeline execution.
Detects malicious shell commands attempting to perform supply-chain persistence via environment variable manipulation in CI/CD environments. The rule identifies processes injecting BASH_ENV into GITHUB_ENV, a known technique used by the SCKIT supply-chain worm to perform credential harvesting during CI pipeline execution.
Detects malicious activities associated with the SCKit worm, specifically targeting package publishing via npm/twine, GitHub Actions workflow injection (runtime-update.yml), and the dropping of postinstall propagation stubs (bootstrap.cjs) when initiated by SCKit processes.
Detects malicious activities associated with the SCKit worm, specifically targeting package publishing via npm/twine, GitHub Actions workflow injection (runtime-update.yml), and the dropping of postinstall propagation stubs (bootstrap.cjs) when initiated by SCKit processes.
Detects malicious activities associated with the SCKit worm, specifically targeting package publishing via npm/twine, GitHub Actions workflow injection (runtime-update.yml), and the dropping of postinstall propagation stubs (bootstrap.cjs) when initiated by SCKit processes.
Detects the Sckit Go implant accessing sensitive local configuration and credential files, including SSH keys, cloud CLI tokens, and package manager credentials. The rule monitors for file read events initiated by processes identified as 'sckit' or processes with specific command line arguments.
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