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Arnold Chan

@slaz
Trusted contributorCompletionist
2 followers2,100 downloads4,384 copies51 likes26,172 views

7,555 detections

This rule detects potential exploitation attempts targeting vulnerabilities within the libheif image processing library. It monitors for image processing binaries (e.g., convert, magick) executing with command-line arguments related to HEIF/HEIC files, followed by multiple application crash events (SIGSEGV, coredumps) associated with libheif on the same device within a short time window.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
106
This rule identifies enterprise resource access from OnePlus or OxygenOS devices that lack proper management or compliance. It calculates an exposure score based on factors including device management status, compliance state, device trust type, and whether the device is newly observed. The rule flags high and medium priority exposure incidents, specifically targeting non-managed or non-compliant BYOD devices, which could represent an increased risk profile for corporate data access.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
001
Detects high or medium severity security alerts related to Kerberos Golden Ticket forgery, as identified by Microsoft Defender for Identity. This rule filters for specific alert names indicative of forged TGTs minted from the krbtgt account, excluding generic or informational ticket anomalies.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
1 month ago
002
Detects phishing messages that deliberately mix writing systems/scripts/homoglyphs in the Subject line as ONE corroborating signal within a broader, multi-signal phishing pattern. Hardened against false positives: brand/product tokens (e.g. Microsoft, PayPal) are stripped before the Latin-script check so a lone brand mention in non-Latin correspondence doesn't count as mixed-script; the suspicious-URL signal requires a high-confidence credential/urgency term (not generic business vocabulary); sender risk requires the domain to be new to both the recipient and the organization; and at least three independent signal categories (not two) must corroborate the language-confusion signal before the rule fires.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
1 month ago
001
Detects a sequence of activity characteristic of lateral movement and credential theft: the deployment or execution of PsExec service followed by the use of Windows utilities (vssadmin, ntdsutil, esentutl) to perform Volume Shadow Copy-based extraction of the NTDS.dit database or SYSTEM hive on the same host.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
1 month ago
102
Detects a sequence of activity characteristic of lateral movement and credential theft: the deployment or execution of PsExec service followed by the use of Windows utilities (vssadmin, ntdsutil, esentutl) to perform Volume Shadow Copy-based extraction of the NTDS.dit database or SYSTEM hive on the same host.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
1 month ago
002
Detects potential credential reuse attacks such as Pass-the-Hash, Pass-the-Ticket, or Overpass-the-Hash. The rule identifies a 'NewCredentials' logon (e.g., runas /netonly) followed by a network or remote interactive logon to a target system (such as a domain controller) by the same user, without an interactive logon session occurring between the events, which is indicative of using stolen credentials to move laterally.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
1 month ago
002
Detects two distinct behaviors indicative of potential credential theft or lateral movement: DCSync-style Active Directory replication requests identified via Event ID 4662 with specific replication GUIDs, and high-volume SMB traffic originating from Domain Controllers or DC-adjacent hosts, which may indicate unauthorized data access or credential dumping activities.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
1 month ago
002
Detects two distinct behaviors indicative of potential credential theft or lateral movement: DCSync-style Active Directory replication requests identified via Event ID 4662 with specific replication GUIDs, and high-volume SMB traffic originating from Domain Controllers or DC-adjacent hosts, which may indicate unauthorized data access or credential dumping activities.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
1 month ago
002
Detects potential AI-targeted cloaking, a technique where a web server serves different content to AI crawlers versus human users, identified by comparing HTTP response sizes or hashes across session logs. The rule uses Microsoft Sentinel's ASIM Web Session schema to correlate web requests, identifying discrepancies that suggest malicious or evasive intent. Covers T1036 & T1027
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
001
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