Arnold Chan
@slazTrusted contributorCompletionist
2 followers2,100 downloads4,386 copies51 likes26,181 views
7,555 detections
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This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the threat actor SideCopy and their associated malware, such as ReverseRAT. It hunts for specific malicious SHA256 file/process hashes, connections to known malicious C2 infrastructure (IPs and domains), requests to known malicious URLs, and user interaction with these URLs via email clicks.
Detects potential ClickFix-style social engineering attacks where a victim is prompted to execute an encoded PowerShell command (often via copy-paste into a terminal). The rule specifically monitors PowerShell processes initiated by shell environments (explorer.exe, cmd.exe, or WindowsTerminal.exe) that execute encoded, hidden scripts to perform multiple suspicious network requests for files (e.g., .zip, .enc, .bin) from non-standard domains.
This rule detects potential web shell activity by identifying instances where a web server process creates or modifies a PHP file within a 'wp-content/themes' directory, followed closely (within 15 minutes) by that same web server process spawning a shell process (e.g., sh, bash, cmd.exe).
This rule detects potential web shell activity by identifying instances where a web server process creates or modifies a PHP file within a 'wp-content/themes' directory, followed closely (within 15 minutes) by that same web server process spawning a shell process (e.g., sh, bash, cmd.exe).
Detects a specifically malformed IPv6 Routing Header (type 0) with a 'segments_left' value of 255 preceding an Authentication Header (AH). This signature targets an exploit pattern known as 'DirtyAH6', which aims to trigger a remote kernel crash or potential remote code execution on vulnerable systems by manipulating IPv6 header processing.
This rule detects processes accessing sensitive credential, configuration, or environment files typically stored in locations like .aws, .ssh, .kube, or application user directories. It alerts when a non-standard or unexpected process touches multiple sensitive folders, or when specific suspicious process names or known malicious tools (such as 'NeedleStealer') are observed interacting with these files. This is indicative of potential credential harvesting or reconnaissance activities.
Detects a suspected exploitation attempt of CVE-2026-81000, known as TUNderflow. The detection looks for a sequence of events where a process initializes a user namespace (unshare) followed by a kernel panic or error report from the tun/tap driver originating from the same process lineage within a short timeframe, which is indicative of an integer overflow exploit leading to kernel instability.
This rule detects phishing emails where the sender's display name impersonates well-known brands (e.g., Microsoft, DocuSign, Zoom) while using a non-official domain. It further correlates these suspicious senders with embedded URLs that either match the targeted brands' domains or contain patterns commonly associated with device code phishing or API verification workflows.
Detects the sharedLoad.min.js obfuscated first-stage loader dropped by the malicious npm indexed-btree package, triggered via BTree.prototype.set to evade static/taint-analysis scanners
Detects the sharedLoad.min.js obfuscated first-stage loader dropped by the malicious npm indexed-btree package, triggered via BTree.prototype.set to evade static/taint-analysis scanners
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