Arnold Chan
@slazTrusted contributorCompletionist
2 followers2,100 downloads4,386 copies51 likes26,181 views
7,555 detections
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924
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18
Detects the execution of RatHat, a Go-based Android native daemon masquerading as 'liblocal-service.so'. The rule identifies the malware's use of ADB-derived shell commands to bypass Android Doze mode, prioritize background execution, and tamper with installed applications via pm (package manager) commands.
Detects the specific TCP handshake pattern characteristic of the Fast Reverse Proxy (FRP) client (frpc) initiating a connection to a command-and-control server. The rule inspects established traffic for specific metadata strings ('privilege_key', 'run_id', 'pool_count') within the initial handshake payload.
Detects activity associated with the 'MovieReaper' threat campaign by identifying known malicious file hashes, command and control (C2) IP addresses, and communication with identified malicious domains. This rule monitors process execution, file operations, and network connections within the campaign's active timeframe.
Detects bursts of AI-paraphrased, brand/executive-impersonating email lures delivered to the inbox: clusters near-duplicate subject-line variants from the same sending domain within a 6-hour window, and requires a corroborating signal (authentication failure or a sender domain first seen within the last 14 days) plus an ESP allow-list exclusion to avoid flagging legitimate bulk/newsletter mail. Maps to T1683 (Generate Content) as the downstream-delivery proxy for AI-generated lure content.
Detects bursts of AI-paraphrased, brand/executive-impersonating email lures delivered to the inbox: clusters near-duplicate subject-line variants from the same sending domain within a 6-hour window, and requires a corroborating signal (authentication failure or a sender domain first seen within the last 14 days) plus an ESP allow-list exclusion to avoid flagging legitimate bulk/newsletter mail. Maps to T1683 (Generate Content) as the downstream-delivery proxy for AI-generated lure content.
Detects bursts of AI-paraphrased, brand/executive-impersonating email lures delivered to the inbox: clusters near-duplicate subject-line variants from the same sending domain within a 6-hour window, and requires a corroborating signal (authentication failure or a sender domain first seen within the last 14 days) plus an ESP allow-list exclusion to avoid flagging legitimate bulk/newsletter mail. Maps to T1683 (Generate Content) as the downstream-delivery proxy for AI-generated lure content.
Detects bursts of AI-paraphrased, brand/executive-impersonating email lures delivered to the inbox: clusters near-duplicate subject-line variants from the same sending domain within a 6-hour window, and requires a corroborating signal (authentication failure or a sender domain first seen within the last 14 days) plus an ESP allow-list exclusion to avoid flagging legitimate bulk/newsletter mail. Maps to T1683 (Generate Content) as the downstream-delivery proxy for AI-generated lure content.
Detects accounts showing a spike in requests to public generative-AI services compared to their historical baseline, combined with anomalous indicators like multiple source IPs, regions, or off-hours activity.
Detects accounts showing a spike in requests to public generative-AI services compared to their historical baseline, combined with anomalous indicators like multiple source IPs, regions, or off-hours activity.
Detects instances where a single user account exhibits an anomalously high frequency of requests to public generative-AI platforms within a one-hour window, potentially indicating automated reconnaissance or data staging activities using AI tools.
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