Arnold Chan
@slazTrusted contributorCompletionist
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7,555 detections
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Detects network activity related to the SectopRAT malware downloading a secondary module named 'WbElevation.dll' from a known command and control (C2) server. This module is typically associated with browser credential theft functionality.
Detects anomalous C2 traffic associated with SectopRAT that leverages JSON-RPC 'eth_call' methods on 'binance.org'. The detection monitors for a specific POST request pattern followed by a response containing 'START' and 'FINISH' markers within the result field, indicating command-and-control communication disguised as blockchain interactions.
Detects the suspicious loading of both 'FrameworkBase.dll' and 'sdkcra.dll' by the 'ReportDump.exe' process within a two-minute window. This behavior is often associated with the execution of specialized tools or potential post-exploitation activity where legitimate processes are abused to load specific modules.
Detects the execution of base64 encoded PowerShell commands initiated by conhost.exe with the --headless flag. The decoded command contains specific suspicious patterns, including accessing environment variables, reading file content, and deleting files, which is characteristic of malicious scripts attempting to stealthily interact with the environment.
This rule detects HTTP GET requests resulting in the download of an Android Package (.apk) file where the host is not a known official Google Play or reputable third-party application distribution source. It further validates the detection by inspecting the HTTP response headers for the specific Android application package MIME type and the response body for indicators commonly associated with fake branded application portals.
Detects usage of the Android Debug Bridge (ADB) 'pair' command initiated by processes other than known legitimate Android development tools (e.g., adb.exe, Android Studio). This may indicate an attacker attempting to wirelessly pair a malicious device or gain unauthorized access to an Android device over the network.
This rule detects a specific persistence technique used by AvisLoader malware. It monitors for the creation of a .lnk.backup file alongside a corresponding .lnk shortcut modification in common shell locations (Desktop, Taskbar, etc.), coupled with the execution of wscript.exe or cscript.exe referencing the 'VLCAssistant' VBScript within a short time window. This sequence indicates an attempt to persist malicious activity by backing up existing shortcuts and replacing them with a launcher for the AvisLoader payload.
This rule detects a specific persistence technique used by AvisLoader malware. It monitors for the creation of a .lnk.backup file alongside a corresponding .lnk shortcut modification in common shell locations (Desktop, Taskbar, etc.), coupled with the execution of wscript.exe or cscript.exe referencing the 'VLCAssistant' VBScript within a short time window. This sequence indicates an attempt to persist malicious activity by backing up existing shortcuts and replacing them with a launcher for the AvisLoader payload.
Detects execution of auto.exe (associated with AvisLoader) combined with a specific registry-based UAC bypass technique using the ICMLuaUtil COM elevation moniker (CLSID 3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7). This pattern is characteristic of UACME method 41 to achieve privilege escalation.
Detects execution of auto.exe (associated with AvisLoader) combined with a specific registry-based UAC bypass technique using the ICMLuaUtil COM elevation moniker (CLSID 3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7). This pattern is characteristic of UACME method 41 to achieve privilege escalation.
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