Arnold Chan
@slazTrusted contributorCompletionist
2 followers2,099 downloads4,316 copies51 likes25,742 views
7,544 detections
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Detects inbound emails featuring Spanish government and COVID-19 themes in the subject or sender display name, which contain URLs pointing to domains resembling Amnesty International or various media organizations, indicating potential phishing or social engineering campaigns.
Detects inbound emails featuring Spanish government and COVID-19 themes in the subject or sender display name, which contain URLs pointing to domains resembling Amnesty International or various media organizations, indicating potential phishing or social engineering campaigns.
Detects inbound emails featuring Spanish government and COVID-19 themes in the subject or sender display name, which contain URLs pointing to domains resembling Amnesty International or various media organizations, indicating potential phishing or social engineering campaigns.
Surfaces Microsoft Defender alerts that reference Candiru/DevilsTongue spyware terms or associated CVEs (such as CVE-2021-31979, CVE-2021-33771, etc.) attributed in threat intelligence reports.
Surfaces Microsoft Defender alerts that reference Candiru/DevilsTongue spyware terms or associated CVEs (such as CVE-2021-31979, CVE-2021-33771, etc.) attributed in threat intelligence reports.
Detects the presence of known Candiru Windows DLL implant IOC hashes across device file events, process events, image loads, and email attachments.
Detects the presence of known Candiru Windows DLL implant IOC hashes across device file events, process events, image loads, and email attachments.
Detects the presence of known Candiru Windows DLL implant IOC hashes across device file events, process events, image loads, and email attachments.
Sweeps network connection, HTTP/proxy, file, and process telemetry for exact matches against known Cling botnet indicators: dedicated STUN C2/operator IPs, Cling MIPS loader staging URLs, and known Cling sample SHA256 hashes. Tightened to exclude broad domain-level matching on stun.l.google.com (legitimate, ubiquitous Google STUN infrastructure that Cling spoofs/abuses rather than owns) and to match payload-staging hosts only by full URL rather than bare IP, reducing false positives from shared/compromised hosting and unrelated legitimate STUN traffic.
Detects clusters of high-volume external source IPs from multiple countries sweeping the same financial web services within an hour.
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