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Arnold Chan

@slaz
Trusted contributorCompletionist
2 followers2,100 downloads4,388 copies51 likes26,186 views

7,555 detections

Detects the Kimsuky trojanized .NET installer OrionQuests-Setup.exe that decrypts embedded AES resource OrionSetup.payload.enc to drop a decoy OrionLauncher installer and malicious LNK file
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
002
Detects the Kimsuky trojanized .NET installer OrionQuests-Setup.exe that decrypts embedded AES resource OrionSetup.payload.enc to drop a decoy OrionLauncher installer and malicious LNK file
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
2 months ago
002
Detects the Kimsuky trojanized .NET installer OrionQuests-Setup.exe that decrypts embedded AES resource OrionSetup.payload.enc to drop a decoy OrionLauncher installer and malicious LNK file
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
002
This rule detects potential malicious activity by monitoring for known malicious file hashes (MD5) across file and process events, and correlating them with known Command and Control (C2) infrastructure communication patterns, including specific IP addresses and URI paths.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Hunters
2 months ago
002
This rule detects potential malicious activity by monitoring for known malicious file hashes (MD5) across file and process events, and correlating them with known Command and Control (C2) infrastructure communication patterns, including specific IP addresses and URI paths.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
002
This rule detects potential malicious activity by monitoring for known malicious file hashes (MD5) across file and process events, and correlating them with known Command and Control (C2) infrastructure communication patterns, including specific IP addresses and URI paths.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
002
This rule detects potential malicious activity by monitoring for known malicious file hashes (MD5) across file and process events, and correlating them with known Command and Control (C2) infrastructure communication patterns, including specific IP addresses and URI paths.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
002
This rule detects the creation of a scheduled task via schtasks.exe that uses a name similar to 'Google Chrome Update' but is initiated by a process other than the legitimate Google Update executable or from an unexpected folder location. This behavior is commonly used by adversaries to establish persistence while masquerading as legitimate software update mechanisms.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
002
This rule detects the creation of a scheduled task via schtasks.exe that uses a name similar to 'Google Chrome Update' but is initiated by a process other than the legitimate Google Update executable or from an unexpected folder location. This behavior is commonly used by adversaries to establish persistence while masquerading as legitimate software update mechanisms.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
002
This rule detects the creation of a scheduled task via schtasks.exe that uses a name similar to 'Google Chrome Update' but is initiated by a process other than the legitimate Google Update executable or from an unexpected folder location. This behavior is commonly used by adversaries to establish persistence while masquerading as legitimate software update mechanisms.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
2 months ago
002
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