Arnold Chan
@slazTrusted contributorCompletionist
2 followers2,100 downloads4,389 copies51 likes26,189 views
7,555 detections
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Detects network activity associated with the 'ClickFix' campaign, specifically targeting DNS queries, TLS SNI, HTTP Host headers, and direct IP connections to known malicious infrastructure domains (cdnsuicaches.com, mnl.ac) and exfiltration endpoints (23.227.198.199).
Detects network indicators associated with the StealC information stealer, including DNS lookups for identified C2 domains, HTTPS traffic to known C2 endpoints, and suspicious POST requests using multipart/form-data indicative of credential or session data exfiltration.
Detects network activity associated with the 'ClickFix' campaign, specifically targeting the cdnsuicaches[.]com domain. The rules identify the initial DNS query, the subsequent TLS SNI connection, and the retrieval of malicious JavaScript containing the 'cookie-captcha-complete' overlay signature. This behavior is indicative of a browser-based social engineering attack.
This detection identifies enabled user accounts that have not had a successful sign-in for the last 90 days, highlighting potential security risks from dormant accounts.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by correlating three distinct events: the execution of a suspicious, potentially obfuscated binary (matching a specific naming pattern of _win64.exe) from an untrusted location (e.g., Temp, AppData, Downloads), followed by a high volume of file modifications or renames with specific ransomware-related extensions (.locked), and the dropping of a known ransom note file (RESTORE_FILES.txt) within a short 15-minute time window.
This rule detects the presence, installation, or execution attempts of the known vulnerable GIGABYTE driver (gdrv.sys). Monitoring for this specific driver is a common practice to identify attempts to perform 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) attacks, which can be used for kernel-mode code execution and privilege escalation.
Detects instances where AI coding assistants or tools (e.g., Claude, Copilot, Gemini) invoke git.exe to clone or fetch repositories from non-standard (non-GitHub) hosts, followed by a checkout operation within a short timeframe. This behavior may indicate an attacker using automated tools to stage or exfiltrate sensitive code repositories to unauthorized infrastructure.
Detects processes running from user-writable locations (Temp/AppData/Public/Downloads) creating a self-referential Windows Firewall allow rule via netsh, consistent with NJRAT establishing outbound C2 connectivity while evading network-based blocking.
Detects unauthorized exploitation attempts against the LiteLLM Model Context Protocol (MCP) endpoint. The rule monitors for a specific malformed Authorization header pattern (short, non-standard token) associated with CVE-2026-59822, indicating potential vulnerability scanning or exploitation of the service.
Detects network traffic initiated by the WeaselBiscuit loader targeting api.npoint.io, a known free JSON storage service often abused by adversaries as a dead drop resolver for Command and Control (C2) configurations or secondary payloads.
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