Arnold Chan
@slazTrusted contributorCompletionist
2 followers2,099 downloads4,319 copies51 likes25,767 views
7,544 detections
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This rule monitors network traffic for TLS SNI and HTTP URI indicators associated with known typo-squatted or spoofed Google Drive and Google Meet phishing domains. It also detects the download of a specific ZIP archive used as a phishing lure.
Detects the Akira ransomware binary staged as C:\storage\win.exe and identified by its known SHA256 hash
Detects the GOST tunnel binary deployed as svchost.exe from a staging directory, identified by its known hash, or by an unsigned PE importing config.dll with a matching MZ header and embedded config.dll reference (reduces FPs from legitimately signed software that imports a DLL of the same name)
This rule detects outbound network connections directed at a known IP address associated with Akira ransomware infrastructure. The rule specifically monitors for communication with 64.227.4.134, which has been identified as a C2 node utilizing GOST tunnels. This behavior is indicative of established C2 connectivity by Akira ransomware actors.
Detects the GOST tunnel binary deployed as svchost.exe from a staging directory, identified by its known hash, or by an unsigned PE importing config.dll with a matching MZ header and embedded config.dll reference (reduces FPs from legitimately signed software that imports a DLL of the same name)
Detects emails from free-mail domains (@mail.com or @outlook.com) that contain a specific malicious infrastructure indicator in the InternetMessageId or originate from a known suspicious IP address associated with TA419-style spoofing campaigns. This indicates the email was relayed through unauthorized infrastructure rather than the expected legitimate mail providers.
Detects DNS queries and TLS SNI traffic associated with known lookalike domains used by the threat actor TA419 for organization impersonation, which are commonly utilized in spearphishing campaigns.
Detects DNS queries, HTTP host headers, and TLS SNI traffic associated with known credential-phishing domains used by the threat actor TA419. The rule monitors for communication to a specific list of domains identified as malicious or used in phishing campaigns.
Detects network activity associated with the TA419 threat group's 'Frameless' Browser-in-the-Browser (BitB) Adversary-in-the-Middle (AitM) phishing campaign. The rules identify unauthorized OAuth2 authorization requests to non-Microsoft hosts that match known malicious client IDs, the delivery of BitB overlay scripts, and the subsequent execution of malicious scripts correlated with OneDrive-themed lookalike redirects, indicating a credential theft attempt.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events involving NetScaler ADC or Gateway appliances: anomalous account authentication, followed by the establishment of a VPN or remote access session, and subsequent unusual outbound network activity indicating potential lateral movement or C2 communication from the appliance.
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