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Arnold Chan

@slaz
Trusted contributorCompletionist
2 followers2,100 downloads4,386 copies51 likes26,184 views

7,555 detections

Detects execution of the tar utility by the prl_disp_service process with a command line pattern indicative of command injection via the --use-compress-program flag. This technique is often used to execute arbitrary commands by embedding them within the compression program argument.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
001
Detects the 'prl_disp_service' process spawning 'tar' with the '--use-compress-program' flag set to an unconventional binary. This behavior is associated with the exploitation of ParaShells (CVE-2026-90894), where an attacker leverages the compression program hook in 'tar' to execute arbitrary commands with root privileges.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
001
Detects the 'prl_disp_service' process spawning 'tar' with the '--use-compress-program' flag set to an unconventional binary. This behavior is associated with the exploitation of ParaShells (CVE-2026-90894), where an attacker leverages the compression program hook in 'tar' to execute arbitrary commands with root privileges.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
001
Detects the 'prl_disp_service' process spawning 'tar' with the '--use-compress-program' flag set to an unconventional binary. This behavior is associated with the exploitation of ParaShells (CVE-2026-90894), where an attacker leverages the compression program hook in 'tar' to execute arbitrary commands with root privileges.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
001
Detects instances where the Parallels dispatcher service (prl_disp_service) is invoked to install an appliance using a local 'file:///tmp/' URL instead of a trusted remote catalog source, which may indicate an attempt to load unauthorized or malicious virtual appliance files.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
001
Detects GitHub OAuth authorization, repository cloning, or ZIP downloads from source IP addresses that have not been observed for the specific actor within the past 30 days. This rule helps identify potential account compromise or token theft where an attacker attempts to access repository data from a new location, while specifically excluding bot/service accounts known for rotating CI infrastructure IPs.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
000
Detects GitHub OAuth authorization, repository cloning, or ZIP downloads from source IP addresses that have not been observed for the specific actor within the past 30 days. This rule helps identify potential account compromise or token theft where an attacker attempts to access repository data from a new location, while specifically excluding bot/service accounts known for rotating CI infrastructure IPs.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
000
Detects active phishing threat-intelligence indicators whose domain name uses one of the disposable TLDs observed across IronToll's 73+ rotating lookalike domains (.cfd, .sbs, .icu, .buzz, etc.). Scoped to the structured ThreatType classification only — dropped the free-text 'Description has phishing' fallback, since KQL's 'has' is a substring/token match with no negation awareness (e.g. a description stating an indicator is 'not related to phishing' would still match), which could pull in indicators unrelated to actual phishing activity.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
005
Detects Certificate Transparency log entries indicating the issuance of Let's Encrypt certificates where the issuer identifies as 'YE1' and the domain subjects match specific brand impersonation tokens, often associated with fraudulent disposable top-level domains.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
005
Detects GitHub repository actions (git.clone, oauth_authorization.create, repo.download_zip) from actor IPs not seen for that user in the prior 30 days, requiring either 3+ actions or activity across 2+ distinct repositories from the new IP within the same day. Aggregating to burst/multi-repo behavior (rather than alerting on a single new-IP event) filters out one-off false positives from travel, VPNs, or dynamic IP reassignment while still surfacing sustained anomalous access patterns consistent with account compromise or bulk exfiltration.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
2 months ago
000
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