Arnold Chan
@slazTrusted contributorCompletionist
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7,555 detections
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Detects rapid, repeated execution of process control utilities (kill, strace, inotifywait, timeout) directed at monitored processes, often used by malware (such as 'redtail') to disable security monitoring, debugging, or auditing tools on Linux systems.
Detects a sequence of suspicious behaviors on a single host within a 1-hour window, indicative of an adversary establishing a foothold and preparing for malicious activity. The pattern involves: 1) System architecture discovery, 2) Downloading files from an external IP address, 3) Changing permissions of files in temporary directories (e.g., /tmp, /var/tmp, /dev/shm), and 4) Executing files directly from those same temporary directories.
CloudSEK researchers uncovered BigBear 2.0, a global Microsoft 365 phishing-as-a-service operation targeting hundreds of organizations across 40+ countries. The investigation exposed the attacker’s admin panel, affiliate network, phishing infrastructure, and thousands of stolen credentials and session cookies, revealing how modern AiTM attacks can hijack authenticated sessions even after MFA.
This rule monitors for network connections to known command-and-control (C2) IP addresses and the execution or presence of files matching known hashes associated with the 'PhantomC2' threat group or malware family. It correlates data from DeviceNetworkEvents, DeviceFileEvents, and DeviceProcessEvents to identify potential compromise.
Detects network communication with known Command and Control (C2) IP addresses associated with Phantom Stealer malware. This rule monitors both outbound connections from the internal network and inbound traffic from the identified malicious infrastructure.
Detects PowerShell or PowerShell ISE spawned directly from Windows Explorer (explorer.exe, covering both Start-menu launches and the Run dialog abused by ClickFix) whose command line carries a genuine obfuscation/evasion signal - true -EncodedCommand/-e usage, a hidden/minimized window flag, or a remote download cradle (IEX, Invoke-WebRequest, DownloadString, certutil, mshta, etc.) - while excluding invocations that point at an on-disk script file under a standard install path, since ClickFix payloads are inline one-liners rather than references to a local .ps1. Bare -NoProfile/-NoLogo flags no longer trigger alone, since they are common in legitimate automation.
Detects PowerShell or PowerShell ISE spawned directly from Windows Explorer (explorer.exe, covering both Start-menu launches and the Run dialog abused by ClickFix) whose command line carries a genuine obfuscation/evasion signal - true -EncodedCommand/-e usage, a hidden/minimized window flag, or a remote download cradle (IEX, Invoke-WebRequest, DownloadString, certutil, mshta, etc.) - while excluding invocations that point at an on-disk script file under a standard install path, since ClickFix payloads are inline one-liners rather than references to a local .ps1. Bare -NoProfile/-NoLogo flags no longer trigger alone, since they are common in legitimate automation.
Detects network traffic on TCP port 3308 consistent with VectraRAT beaconing, utilizing MessagePack-over-TCP. The rule monitors for established connections to external networks with specific stream size and content characteristics typical of this C2 communication channel.
Detects network traffic on TCP port 3308 consistent with VectraRAT beaconing, utilizing MessagePack-over-TCP. The rule monitors for established connections to external networks with specific stream size and content characteristics typical of this C2 communication channel.
Detects network traffic on TCP port 3308 consistent with VectraRAT beaconing, utilizing MessagePack-over-TCP. The rule monitors for established connections to external networks with specific stream size and content characteristics typical of this C2 communication channel.
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