Arnold Chan
@slazTrusted contributorCompletionist
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7,555 detections
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Detects Terraform processes (init or apply) executed in conjunction with suspicious post-deployment indicators, such as references to '.terraform' folders, execution of automation scripts like 'dlp.sh' or 'dlp-docker.sh', or access to sensitive telemetry data external to typical infrastructure management.
This rule detects unauthorized or suspicious access to sensitive configuration and credential files (e.g., .aws, .azure, .ssh) by specific DLP (Data Loss Prevention) or automation scripts, and identifies subsequent attempts to expose environment variables or sensitive tokens within process command lines.
This rule detects process command line arguments that include the string 'data.external.telemetry', which may indicate the use of specialized tools, telemetry collection agents, or unauthorized data exfiltration channels.
Detects network activity from infrastructure provisioner tools (Terraform, Coder) or shell processes attempting to connect to suspicious domains (e.g., coder-infra.com) that resemble legitimate infrastructure domains. This activity is indicative of credential theft, specifically targeting OIDC tokens, SSH keys, or authentication tokens during automated provisioning processes.
Detects PEEP credential/session theft via the native-messaging bridge, native host registration, staged CRX, or extension ID references. The nm_host.exe branch is now anchored to the known PEEP extension IDs (primary and alternate build) or the com.peep.lab path, rather than firing on any nm_host.exe spawned by a browser.
Detects Microsoft 365 sign-in events where a session token is reused without a fresh MFA challenge, originating from known residential proxy service providers. This behavior is indicative of threat actors using stolen session tokens (Session Replay) to bypass MFA protections.
This rule detects potentially malicious PowerShell execution patterns involving hidden windows, administrative elevation via 'Start-Process -Verb RunAs', and the targeting or execution of rsetup64.exe within specific system paths. It also flags execution chains where 'net session' commands, often used for discovery or local privilege verification, are piped to null and followed by or initiate the same target executables, suggesting lateral movement or persistence attempts.
Detects the use of the native Windows registry utility 'reg.exe' to import configuration files (install.reg) related to the Radmin remote access software, specifically targeting the security settings registry path.
Detects the use of the Windows reg.exe utility to copy Registry keys related to Radmin, a legitimate remote access tool that is frequently abused by threat actors for persistence and remote control. The command-line arguments /s and /f indicate a silent, forced copy operation, which is characteristic of script-based configuration tampering.
This rule detects potential VNC remote access activity by identifying systems that exhibit both the presence of specific VNC configuration/history files (AccInfo.ini, History.txt) and concurrent network activity on port 10635, which is commonly associated with VNC-like remote access tools.
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