Arnold Chan
@slazTrusted contributorCompletionist
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7,544 detections
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Detects DNS queries and TLS SNI traffic associated with known lookalike domains used by the threat actor TA419 for organization impersonation, which are commonly utilized in spearphishing campaigns.
Detects the Akira ransomware binary staged as C:\storage\win.exe and identified by its known SHA256 hash
Detects the Akira ransomware binary staged as C:\storage\win.exe and identified by its known SHA256 hash
This rule detects outbound network connections directed at a known IP address associated with Akira ransomware infrastructure. The rule specifically monitors for communication with 64.227.4.134, which has been identified as a C2 node utilizing GOST tunnels. This behavior is indicative of established C2 connectivity by Akira ransomware actors.
Detects the GOST tunnel binary deployed as svchost.exe from a staging directory, identified by its known hash, or by an unsigned PE importing config.dll with a matching MZ header and embedded config.dll reference (reduces FPs from legitimately signed software that imports a DLL of the same name)
Detects process/file hashes associated with the ChatGPT Custom GPT ClickFix
campaign via Windows process_creation telemetry. Split from the combined IOC
hunt: Sigma supports only one logsource per rule, so IP/domain/URL matching live
in separate network_connection and dns_query rules.
campaign via Windows process_creation telemetry. Split from the combined IOC
hunt: Sigma supports only one logsource per rule, so IP/domain/URL matching live
in separate network_connection and dns_query rules.
This rule detects various malicious indicators including known file hashes, IP addresses, domains, and specific URLs associated with threat activity. It consolidates hits from process, file, and network telemetry to alert on potential compromise or communication with identified command-and-control (C2) infrastructure.
Detects TLS connections to a specific, potentially adversary-controlled ScreenConnect relay infrastructure endpoint. Adversaries frequently abuse legitimate remote access tools like ScreenConnect for command and control purposes.
Detects the execution of a ScreenConnect installer executable followed by the deployment or startup of its associated client components (WindowsClient.exe or ClientService.exe) within a 30-minute window on the same device. This rule is designed to identify the unauthorized installation or deployment of remote access software.
Detects the execution of a ScreenConnect installer executable followed by the deployment or startup of its associated client components (WindowsClient.exe or ClientService.exe) within a 30-minute window on the same device. This rule is designed to identify the unauthorized installation or deployment of remote access software.
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