Arnold Chan
@slazTrusted contributorCompletionist
2 followers2,100 downloads4,383 copies51 likes26,130 views
7,555 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
5,650
1,006
394
169
98
Categories
2,356
1,807
1,233
1,013
924
Platforms
4,191
1,622
1,250
676
676
Products / Services
2,820
1,003
991
720
485
MITRE Techniques
2,087
1,520
1,413
1,070
536
CVEs
38
33
24
22
21
IDS Classtypes
477
179
104
79
52
IDS Protocols
554
156
144
86
18
This rule detects suspicious file operations (creation, modification, or renaming) initiated by MsMpEng.exe (Microsoft Defender Antivirus) involving specific indicators related to ELAM (Early Launch Anti-Malware) or 'ShieldCrash' components. These indicators often suggest tampering attempts or the presence of tools designed to interfere with Defender's security operations by targeting its configuration, staging, or protected storage locations.
Detects high-frequency file creation, modification, or renaming activity involving files with the specific '.df_win' extension, likely indicative of mass encryption activity or automated ransomware behavior. The rule excludes known backup and security software processes to reduce noise.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity where multiple critical processes (such as database engines or email clients) are terminated in a short time frame, correlated with a high volume of file creation or modification events on the same device. This behavior is indicative of destructive activity, such as ransomware encrypting data stores or disabling defensive software.
Detects multiple methods of tampering with Windows security controls, including disabling Windows SmartScreen via registry, bulk removal of Mark-of-the-Web (Zone.Identifier) via scripting, and disabling driver signature enforcement (TestSigning/NoIntegrityChecks) using BCDedit. These actions are indicative of an adversary attempting to bypass security protections to facilitate the execution of untrusted or malicious code.
Detects msiexec.exe executing from the Temp directory with suspicious command-line arguments (such as hidden windows) and spawning child processes like cmd.exe, tasklist.exe, or taskkill.exe. This behavior is often indicative of malicious installation scripts attempting to perform discovery or terminate security processes while remaining stealthy.
This rule detects instances where a process named 'wsc_updata.exe' executing from a Temp directory loads a library named 'wsc.dll'. This behavior is characteristic of DLL side-loading or DLL hijacking, where a malicious or potentially unwanted executable attempts to load a library from a user-writable directory to execute arbitrary code.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity associated with removable media (USB drives) by identifying two distinct patterns: first, the creation of an 'autorun.inf' file on a removable drive followed by the execution of a script or executable from that same drive shortly after. Second, it identifies executables appearing on removable media that are launched across multiple distinct hosts within a one-hour window, which may indicate worm-like spreading or mass-malware distribution via portable storage.
Detects TCP connections on standard web ports from internal hosts to known IronToll C2 IPs on Tencent/Alibaba Cloud. Scoped to web ports and an established handshake, with a per-source hourly alert cap to reduce repeat noise.
Detects TCP connections on standard web ports from internal hosts to known IronToll C2 IPs on Tencent/Alibaba Cloud. Scoped to web ports and an established handshake, with a per-source hourly alert cap to reduce repeat noise.
Detects DNS queries for lookalike domains combining a government/brand-impersonation keyword (as its own label, not a substring) with a disposable TLD used across the IronToll campaign. Dropped the standalone 'digital' keyword, which was generic enough to match ordinary e-commerce domains on the same TLDs.
Page 553 of 756