Arnold Chan
@slazTrusted contributorCompletionist
2 followers2,099 downloads4,369 copies51 likes26,049 views
7,555 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
5,650
1,006
394
169
98
Categories
2,356
1,807
1,233
1,013
924
Platforms
4,191
1,622
1,250
676
676
Products / Services
2,820
1,003
991
720
485
MITRE Techniques
2,087
1,520
1,413
1,070
536
CVEs
38
33
24
22
21
IDS Classtypes
477
179
104
79
52
IDS Protocols
554
156
144
86
18
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a user's password is changed or reset by an administrator (or help-desk role) followed within a short time window by that same user registering a new MFA device, potentially indicating a vishing-based account takeover attack (e.g., PREY-0058/UNC6671).
This rule detects rapid enumeration of Azure AD identity and configuration components by identifying a burst of specific, high-level administrative API calls (Get user flows, Get API connectors, Get identity providers, Get user attributes) within a short window. This pattern is indicative of reconnaissance activities aimed at mapping out the identity provider configuration.
Detects anomalous access to Microsoft 365 services (OneDrive, SharePoint, Mail) where the user activity is characterized by a high volume of operations (more than 30) across a diverse set of objects (more than 15) within a one-hour window. The detection focuses on activity originating from specific common automation/scripting User-Agents (Microsoft Graph, Python httpx/requests) that deviate from typical, focused service account behavior.
This rule detects suspicious, high-volume file access or download operations in SharePoint and OneDrive. It filters for activities performed by specific user agents commonly associated with automated scripting tools (e.g., python-requests, Microsoft.Graph.Client), which indicates potential automated exfiltration or unauthorized bulk data collection.
This rule detects potential execution of malicious files from removable media (e.g., USB drives). It monitors for a sequence of events where a removable drive is mounted, a file is subsequently created on that drive, and then that same file is executed within a short time window.
This rule detects potential execution of malicious files from removable media (e.g., USB drives). It monitors for a sequence of events where a removable drive is mounted, a file is subsequently created on that drive, and then that same file is executed within a short time window.
Detects uncommon or suspicious child processes spawning from a WSL process. This could indicate an attempt to evade parent/child relationship detections or persistence attempts via cron using WSL.
Detects uncommon or suspicious child processes spawning from a WSL process. This could indicate an attempt to evade parent/child relationship detections or persistence attempts via cron using WSL.
Detects file creation on a removable drive followed by process execution from that drive shortly after mounting.
Detects nm_host.exe (PEEP native messaging host binary) spawned by Chrome/Edge, tightened to require either the known PEEP extension ID in the native-messaging invocation command line or the distinctive com.peep.lab host path.
Page 594 of 756