
Arnold Chan
@slazTrusted contributorCompletionist
2 followers2,099 downloads4,349 copies51 likes25,936 views
7,555 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
5,650
1,006
394
169
98
Categories
2,356
1,807
1,233
1,013
924
Platforms
4,191
1,622
1,250
676
676
Products / Services
2,820
1,003
991
720
485
MITRE Techniques
2,087
1,520
1,413
1,070
536
CVEs
38
33
24
22
21
IDS Classtypes
477
179
104
79
52
IDS Protocols
554
156
144
86
18
This rule detects potentially unauthorized access to cloud resources or OAuth applications by identifying sign-ins or API calls originating from IP addresses or locations not previously observed for the user in the 30 days prior to a documented Coder registry compromise exposure window.
Detects network activity from infrastructure provisioner tools (Terraform, Coder) or shell processes attempting to connect to suspicious domains (e.g., coder-infra.com) that resemble legitimate infrastructure domains. This activity is indicative of credential theft, specifically targeting OIDC tokens, SSH keys, or authentication tokens during automated provisioning processes.
Detects anomalous actions within the Coder registry, such as template creation, version updates, or dry-run/workspace builds with module caching disabled, that occurred during a known registry compromise window on August 31, 2026.
Detects outbound TCP traffic originating from the internal network destined for a known malicious IP associated with Meterpreter Java payload retrieval and post-exploitation Command and Control (C2) activity, potentially related to PaperCut vulnerability exploitation.
Detects outbound TCP traffic originating from the internal network destined for a known malicious IP associated with Meterpreter Java payload retrieval and post-exploitation Command and Control (C2) activity, potentially related to PaperCut vulnerability exploitation.
Detects Java-based Metasploit/Meterpreter payload files (.class/.jar) dropped post-exploitation, as observed following PaperCut RCE exploitation chain
Detects Node.js or Electron processes executing a command to list installed applications while originating from or residing within suspicious, writable directories such as Temp, AppData, or Public folders, which is a common pattern for reconnaissance by malicious software or droppers.
Detects scripts or files referencing the JSCeal loading chain that invokes node.exe with -r preflight.js to decompress and execute a compiled V8 bytecode app.jsc payload
Detects a suspicious sequence of activities where PowerShell downloads or extracts specific zip files (node.zip, build.zip) to staging directories, followed by the execution of associated binaries like node.exe, winpty-agent.exe, or winpty.dll from those same locations. This behavior is indicative of an adversary staging and executing tooling within temporary user directories.
Detects Node.js or related helper processes executing shell commands (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) or other processes where the execution involves the 'withCreateProcessUser' argument. This often indicates attempts to bypass execution restrictions or run malicious payloads by utilizing Node.js as an execution proxy within unconventional or temporary directories.
Page 634 of 756
