Arnold Chan
@slazTrusted contributorCompletionist
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7,555 detections
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Detects remote administration activity via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) originating from a host that has no recorded history of performing such actions within the previous 30 days. This includes the use of wmic.exe for remote nodes, Invoke-WmiMethod, or WmiPrvSe.exe spawning common command-line interpreters or utilities.
Detects Linux processes masquerading as 'php-fpm' or 'postgres' that match known SHA-256 hashes associated with the RedTail malware family. The rule identifies processes attempting to hide their identity using techniques similar to prctl(PR_SET_NAME) to rename themselves while running malicious code.
Detects the creation or modification of crontab files, as well as the execution of crontab commands, that involve suspicious paths (e.g., /tmp, /var/tmp, /dev/shm, hidden files) or command obfuscation techniques such as base64 encoding. This behavior is often associated with the establishment of persistence by adversaries.
Detects rapid, repetitive queries to system hardware identifiers (DMI, CPU info, virtualization attributes) commonly used by adversaries for reconnaissance or environment awareness (sandbox detection). The rule identifies suspicious behavior by tracking the execution of commands like 'cat', 'grep', or 'dmidecode' that target sensitive Linux system files (e.g., /sys/devices/virtual/dmi/id/*, /proc/cpuinfo) when performed by non-standard parent processes in a short time window.
Detects specific suspicious processes (identified by hash or path) initiating a listening network connection on non-standard ports typically associated with honeypot captures, specifically referencing Cowrie-related paths or known malicious samples.
Detects rapid enumeration of sensitive system information files (CPU info, command line, device ID, node data) by processes executing from transient or commonly abused directories like /tmp, /var/tmp, or /dev/shm, as well as processes identified with specific malware naming patterns. This behavior often indicates an initial discovery phase by a threat actor or automated malicious agent.
This rule detects activities associated with the 'clean.sh' script often used by cryptocurrency miners to remove competing miner processes, terminate services, clear persistence mechanisms (cron jobs), and delete artifacts from temporary directories like /tmp, /var/tmp, or /dev/shm.
Detects the execution of an unsigned 7z.exe that loads an unsigned 7z.dll from a public, user-writable directory (C:\Users\Public\Documents). The rule specifically looks for the creation of the DLL shortly before it is loaded, indicating potential DLL side-loading to bypass security controls using a renamed or modified archive utility.
Detects high-velocity, automated web activity originating from a single source IP that simultaneously performs widespread endpoint enumeration, tests sensitive authentication flows, and attempts common injection attack payloads. This behavior is indicative of an automated scanner, crawler, or malicious botnet agent performing rapid discovery and exploitation attempts.
Detects anomalous authentication attempts where a single source IP validates a high volume of distinct Service Principal or App Client IDs within a short timeframe with a high failure rate. This pattern is indicative of attackers performing bulk validation of stolen API keys or OAuth credentials, likely harvested through mobile application decompilation (APK/IPA analysis).
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