Arnold Chan
@slazTrusted contributorCompletionist
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Detects unauthenticated execution of sensitive Grafana MCP tools (tools/call, grafana_api_request) by identifying session IDs that lack a corresponding authenticated handshake event. This behavior is indicative of potential session spoofing or abuse of the MCP protocol where an attacker attempts to interact with privileged tools without performing a valid authentication handshake.
Detects anomalous outbound network connections from the Grafana MCP (Model Context Protocol) server process to internal private IP address ranges. The rule compares current network activity against a 14-day baseline to filter out known data sources, identifying potentially unauthorized lateral movement or internal network probing via server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerabilities.
Detects Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attempts targeting vulnerable versions of Grafana MCP Server (versions < 1.1.0). The rule identifies requests attempting to access sensitive internal or cloud-metadata endpoints (e.g., 169.254.169.254, localhost, internal subnets) via the X-Grafana-URL header.
Detects instances where the Grafana MCP (Model Context Protocol) server's service account identity executes administrative tools (such as 'grafana_api_request') within a session that lacks a verified, prior authentication event (bearer token). This pattern suggests an adversary may be spoofing or hijacking a privileged service account session to perform unauthorized administrative actions.
No description available.
Detects the execution of cmstp.exe with the /au parameter, which is commonly used to install malicious INF files, when initiated by LockAppHost.exe. This pattern is often indicative of an attempt to bypass application control or achieve privilege escalation by leveraging the legitimate Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer.
Detects the use of PowerShell to add Microsoft Defender exclusions (paths or extensions) where the process was initiated by or involves LockAppHost.exe. This behavior is indicative of an attempt to bypass security protections by excluding malicious artifacts from scanning.
Detects unauthorized processes (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe, node.exe) accessing sensitive web browser files like 'Login Data' or 'Cookies' in common browser directories. This behavior is indicative of credential theft or data exfiltration attempts.
Detects the execution of node.exe or electron.exe with command-line arguments indicative of browser automation (e.g., launching headless browsers, cookie access) when executed from high-risk, writable directories like AppData\Temp, AppData\Roaming, ProgramData, or Users\Public. This behavior is frequently associated with information-stealing malware or unauthorized browser automation.
This rule detects suspicious activity associated with JSCeal proxy handlers. It identifies Node.js or Electron processes running from non-standard, user-writable directories (such as AppData, ProgramData, or Temp folders) that actively delete or modify browser cookie files within standard web browser profile paths, often indicative of session hijacking or data tampering.
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