Arnold Chan
@slazTrusted contributorCompletionist
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7,544 detections
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This rule detects HTTP GET requests for static image assets (jpg, jpeg, png, gif, webp, svg) where the Referer header originates from a .shop top-level domain. This behavior may indicate an unauthorized use of brand image assets, often associated with fraudulent e-commerce sites or phishing campaigns using lookalike or disposable infrastructure.
This rule detects HTTP GET requests for static image assets (jpg, jpeg, png, gif, webp, svg) where the Referer header originates from a .shop top-level domain. This behavior may indicate an unauthorized use of brand image assets, often associated with fraudulent e-commerce sites or phishing campaigns using lookalike or disposable infrastructure.
This rule detects HTTP GET requests for static image assets (jpg, jpeg, png, gif, webp, svg) where the Referer header originates from a .shop top-level domain. This behavior may indicate an unauthorized use of brand image assets, often associated with fraudulent e-commerce sites or phishing campaigns using lookalike or disposable infrastructure.
This rule detects high-volume DNS resolution of domains ending in the .shop TLD from internal hosts, which may indicate interaction with a cluster of infrastructure used by the DoppelCart fake-shop campaign.
This rule detects high-volume DNS resolution of domains ending in the .shop TLD from internal hosts, which may indicate interaction with a cluster of infrastructure used by the DoppelCart fake-shop campaign.
Detects high-frequency DNS query responses for domains ending in '.shop' from external sources within a 10-minute window. This behavior is indicative of domain churn often associated with 'DoppelCart'-style fake e-commerce shop infrastructure.
Detects high-frequency DNS query responses for domains ending in '.shop' from external sources within a 10-minute window. This behavior is indicative of domain churn often associated with 'DoppelCart'-style fake e-commerce shop infrastructure.
Detects high-frequency DNS query responses for domains ending in '.shop' from external sources within a 10-minute window. This behavior is indicative of domain churn often associated with 'DoppelCart'-style fake e-commerce shop infrastructure.
Detects high-volume phishing emails that utilize subjects claiming extreme discounts (e.g., 65% off) and contain links to domains ending in the .shop top-level domain (TLD). The rule correlates email subjects with URL domains and alerts when multiple recipients are targeted by the same sender/domain combination.
Detects high-volume, potentially malicious activity where a client requests a large number of distinct hostnames ending in .shop from a single destination IP address within a short time frame, which may indicate infrastructure used for phishing or fraudulent e-commerce storefronts similar to DoppelCart-style activity.
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