Arnold Chan
@slazTrusted contributorCompletionist
2 followers2,099 downloads4,317 copies51 likes25,758 views
7,544 detections
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Detects Direct Send bypass (null envelope + internal-domain spoof) using a file/document-sharing lure aimed at leadership. Tightened: added inbound-direction and auth-failure requirements (was previously missing any authentication check, so legitimate SharePoint/OneDrive-style sharing notifications from real internal senders could have matched), delivered-only filter, and case-insensitive recipient/job-title join.
Detects Direct Send spearphishing impersonating internal roles (IT/Finance/Procurement) with business-themed lures targeting leadership/finance titles. Rewritten: removed a non-functional sender/recipient substring check and a broken EmailPostDeliveryEvents join that made the rule rarely fire; anchored detection to the actual Direct Send signature (null envelope + domain match) and a direct IdentityInfo join; standardized auth-failure parsing to match the other rules in this set.
Detects SCL-9 (high-confidence phishing/spam) messages that still reach an inbox, indicating an allow-list or transport-rule override, and enriches with any recent tenant mail-flow admin changes. Rewritten: removed a no-op self-join on EmailEvents and a broken exact-match join against CloudAppEvents' raw audit blob (was comparing a sender address against a whole JSON record and would never match); now excludes messages later auto-remediated (e.g. ZAP-quarantined) via the native LatestDeliveryLocation field, and correlates admin rule/allow-list changes via substring match over a cross join.
Detects SCL-9 (high-confidence phishing/spam) messages that still reach an inbox, indicating an allow-list or transport-rule override, and enriches with any recent tenant mail-flow admin changes. Rewritten: removed a no-op self-join on EmailEvents and a broken exact-match join against CloudAppEvents' raw audit blob (was comparing a sender address against a whole JSON record and would never match); now excludes messages later auto-remediated (e.g. ZAP-quarantined) via the native LatestDeliveryLocation field, and correlates admin rule/allow-list changes via substring match over a cross join.
Audits Direct Send traffic against an approved-IP watchlist, flagging unauthenticated inbound mail spoofing an internal domain from an unrecognized source IP. Fixed: RecipientDomain/SenderFromDomain were referenced but never defined (would have errored at runtime); replaced with derived SenderDomain/RecipientDomain consistent with the sibling rules. Removed a noisy display-name-contains-domain OR-branch. Replaced an always-true-in-practice auth check (required every one of SPF/DKIM/DMARC to show literal "Pass", which fails for many legitimate senders that pass via alignment on only one protocol) with the same CompAuth/all-three-fail logic used elsewhere in this set.
Audits Direct Send traffic against an approved-IP watchlist, flagging unauthenticated inbound mail spoofing an internal domain from an unrecognized source IP. Fixed: RecipientDomain/SenderFromDomain were referenced but never defined (would have errored at runtime); replaced with derived SenderDomain/RecipientDomain consistent with the sibling rules. Removed a noisy display-name-contains-domain OR-branch. Replaced an always-true-in-practice auth check (required every one of SPF/DKIM/DMARC to show literal "Pass", which fails for many legitimate senders that pass via alignment on only one protocol) with the same CompAuth/all-three-fail logic used elsewhere in this set.
Audits Direct Send traffic against an approved-IP watchlist, flagging unauthenticated inbound mail spoofing an internal domain from an unrecognized source IP. Fixed: RecipientDomain/SenderFromDomain were referenced but never defined (would have errored at runtime); replaced with derived SenderDomain/RecipientDomain consistent with the sibling rules. Removed a noisy display-name-contains-domain OR-branch. Replaced an always-true-in-practice auth check (required every one of SPF/DKIM/DMARC to show literal "Pass", which fails for many legitimate senders that pass via alignment on only one protocol) with the same CompAuth/all-three-fail logic used elsewhere in this set.
Detects the RejectDirectSend bypass (null SMTP envelope sender + internal-domain spoof). Tightened to require Microsoft's composite auth verdict OR all of SPF/DKIM/DMARC failing (vs. any one), excludes known-approved Direct Send relay IPs, and excludes likely-legitimate bulk/newsletter traffic via BulkComplaintLevel.
This rule detects potential bulk data exfiltration by monitoring for high volumes of file access events (FileAccessed, FileRead, FileModified) originating from the 'doc_helper.aspx' file-management web shell. It summarizes activity by device and user account, flagging instances where over 100 unique files are touched within a short timeframe, which is indicative of automated collection and exfiltration activities.
This rule detects potential bulk data exfiltration by monitoring for high volumes of file access events (FileAccessed, FileRead, FileModified) originating from the 'doc_helper.aspx' file-management web shell. It summarizes activity by device and user account, flagging instances where over 100 unique files are touched within a short timeframe, which is indicative of automated collection and exfiltration activities.
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