Arnold Chan
@slazTrusted contributorCompletionist
2 followers2,099 downloads4,328 copies51 likes25,834 views
7,544 detections
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This rule identifies potential activity related to the Kothamine malware by monitoring for specific file hashes associated with the malware in process and file execution events, as well as network connections to a specific malicious GitHub repository path used for payload delivery.
Detects the initialization and persistence of a 'tailcat.exe' process operating from a non-standard, user-profile directory, typically mimicking legitimate tools. The rule monitors for the specific 'forward' command-line argument containing port mapping strings, an immediate loopback connection to that port, and subsequent periodic external network keep-alive traffic originating from the same process or parent lineage, indicating a C2 tunnel setup.
Detects a sequence of potentially malicious activity targeting LLM-related API endpoints. The rule identifies a client IP performing rapid, distinct endpoint discovery, followed by a POST request to sensitive paths, and concluding with a spike in 5xx server-side errors, indicating potential exploitation attempts or fuzzing against Large Language Model interfaces.
Detects anomalous activity where AI assistant processes (e.g., Claude, ChatGPT, GitHub Copilot) execute a high volume of diverse discovery commands. The rule correlates multiple discovery categories, such as account, network service, system information, and network configuration discovery, occurring within a short timeframe to identify potential abuse of AI-integrated development tools for host reconnaissance.
This rule detects potentially compromised accounts by correlating risky Entra ID sign-ins to Citrix NetScaler with subsequent VPN session establishment followed by rapid, high-volume outbound connection activity from the source IP address. This pattern is indicative of a threat actor using compromised credentials to gain access via VPN and immediately perform internal network scanning or data staging.
This rule performs an indicator of compromise (IOC) hunt for artifacts related to the Lazarus Group's Graphalgo/GHAPPIER campaign. It monitors DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, and DeviceNetworkEvents over the past 90 days to identify matches against known malicious file hashes (SHA256/SHA1), command-and-control (C2) IP addresses, and malicious domains associated with this campaign.
This rule detects the execution or presence of specific Go or Terraform modules known to be malicious or associated with suspicious dependency retrieval. It monitors command-line activity from terraform.exe/go.exe attempting to download/run from these paths, as well as file system events involving these specific folder paths and filenames.
This rule detects activities associated with the Star Blizzard (also known as APT28 or Callisto) group's CosmicPulse malware, specifically the downloader and Python-based backdoor. It monitors for suspicious CPL file execution via UNC paths by rundll32.exe or control.exe, unauthorized modifications to the HKCU\Software\Classes\.mollis registry key used for COM hijacking, and anomalous spawning of Python executables from control host processes in user-writable directories.
This rule detects potential post-compromise activity related to a campaign using MSP360-masqueraded installers and ScreenConnect remote access tools. It performs an IOC sweep across device file events for known malicious file hashes (associated with installers and post-compromise utilities) and device network events for connections to known malicious domains used for command and control.
Detects instances where the Windows command shell (cmd.exe) is used to execute 'dotnet --list-runtimes' with output redirected to sensitive locations (e.g., NUL, temp folders, or text/log files). This pattern is often observed during post-exploitation activities by RMM agents or unauthorized processes attempting to profile the .NET environment while hiding their command output.
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