Arnold Chan
@slazTrusted contributorCompletionist
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7,544 detections
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Hunts network, HTTP, and email-URL telemetry for known ARToken infrastructure (operator backend IPs and phishing/panel domains). Bounded to a 30-day lookback and tiers matches by confidence: domain hits are high-confidence (attacker-registered infrastructure), while IP hits are medium-confidence since the IPs sit on shared DigitalOcean hosting that can be reassigned to unrelated tenants once ARToken's infrastructure is taken down. Empty/unparsed indicator fields are excluded to avoid spurious matches in the HTTP event parsing branch. No known file hashes are associated with this intel.
Detects activity from known Storm-3168 (JADEPUFFER) campaign IP addresses across Azure control-plane, sign-in, and App Service logs. The rule monitors for malicious indicators in Azure Activity logs, Azure Sign-in logs, and Service Principal sign-ins, as well as specific sensitive URI paths (e.g., shells, admin login paths) within App Service HTTP logs.
Detects a service principal attempting to delete multiple Azure SQL databases in a short timeframe, resulting in failures. This pattern is characteristic of malicious data destruction activity, such as that observed in Storm-3168 (JADEPUFFER) campaigns, but accounts for the possibility of misconfigured infrastructure-as-code pipelines by requiring a high volume of failed requests across distinct resources.
Detects a service principal or user account performing a burst of 'ListKeys' operations across multiple Azure Storage accounts. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to dump access keys for multiple storage accounts after initial compromise or privilege escalation to gain further access to sensitive cloud data.
Detects attempts to delete Azure resource locks protecting Site Recovery or Backup services, followed by credential retrieval (ListKeys) within a one-hour window. This sequence pattern is a strong indicator of an adversary attempting to disable backup protection before potentially destroying data or exfiltrating keys.
Detects a suspicious pattern often associated with Storm-3168 (JADEPUFFER) activity: prolonged, high-volume Azure resource enumeration by one service principal, followed shortly by a second service principal performing rapid, multi-subscription enumeration from the same source IP address.
Detects endpoint, process, and network activity associated with the 'TaskStomp' threat actor, specifically targeting known malicious file hashes, command-and-control domains, and specific URLs used in their campaigns.
Detects potential insider threats or departing employees by correlating abnormal bulk data downloads from cloud repositories (SharePoint/OneDrive/Box/etc.) with subsequent sensitive data access and exfiltration signals. It uses baseline behavioral profiling, requires a threshold of sensitive file interactions, and mandates high-confidence exfiltration indicators (removable media usage, suspicious external domains, or multiple combined destination events) to reduce noise. Archive/staging activity is used as an optional confidence booster.
This rule performs a retrospective search across device file and network events for indicators of compromise associated with the UNC6240/ShinyHunters actor's activity against PeopleSoft, specifically linked to CVE-2026-35273. It monitors for known malicious file hashes (JSP webshells and executables), connections to known C2 infrastructure, and DNS lookups for specific malicious domains.
This rule performs a retrospective search across device file and network events for indicators of compromise associated with the UNC6240/ShinyHunters actor's activity against PeopleSoft, specifically linked to CVE-2026-35273. It monitors for known malicious file hashes (JSP webshells and executables), connections to known C2 infrastructure, and DNS lookups for specific malicious domains.
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