Ibrahim Saud
@tektrixIndiaCompletionist
2 followers18,457 downloads7,056 copies47 likes38,421 views
11,679 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
3,760
1,874
1,586
966
944
Categories
4,878
3,246
1,529
1,303
1,122
Platforms
7,678
1,824
1,066
999
986
Products / Services
2,963
1,768
1,278
953
798
MITRE Techniques
3,615
3,555
2,488
1,474
1,186
CVEs
36
27
26
25
23
IDS Classtypes
360
113
38
24
24
IDS Protocols
315
114
93
47
10
Detects a mass influx of OAuth consent grant events for a single application from multiple users within a one-hour window. This behavior is indicative of a consent phishing campaign, where attackers lure users into granting excessive permissions to a malicious application to steal access tokens.
Detects the addition or update of federated identity credentials (FIC) on Entra ID applications or service principals that do not match an approved list of OIDC issuers. This technique, known as Workload Identity Federation, can be abused by adversaries for stealthy, token-less, secret-free persistence.
This rule detects when an OAuth application is granted sensitive Exchange Online permissions, such as 'full_access_as_app', 'Mail.Read', 'Mail.ReadWrite', or 'Mail.Send'. Granting these permissions allows an application to access mailboxes across the tenant without requiring a signed-in user context, which is a common persistence and data exfiltration technique used in Business Email Compromise (BEC) and espionage campaigns.
Detects modifications to Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) Conditional Access policies that lower security posture. This includes disabling an active policy, removing users or groups from enforcement scopes, or removing MFA requirements. Such actions are typical of an adversary attempting to maintain persistent access or evade authentication controls.
This rule detects scenarios where an Azure application's permissions (scopes) are upgraded to high-risk levels after an initial period, a technique known as 'incremental consent'. This is often used by attackers to avoid triggering high-risk consent alerts during the initial application authorization process, subsequently escalating privileges over time.
Detects modifications to Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) Conditional Access policies that lower security posture. This includes disabling an active policy, removing users or groups from enforcement scopes, or removing MFA requirements. Such actions are typical of an adversary attempting to maintain persistent access or evade authentication controls.
This rule detects scenarios where an Azure application's permissions (scopes) are upgraded to high-risk levels after an initial period, a technique known as 'incremental consent'. This is often used by attackers to avoid triggering high-risk consent alerts during the initial application authorization process, subsequently escalating privileges over time.
Detects the creation of a new application secret or credential in a cloud environment followed by an immediate authentication attempt using that credential from an IP address that has not been observed performing successful authentication within the specified lookback window. This behavior is indicative of potential unauthorized persistence or the use of compromised credentials by an adversary.
Detects malicious attempts to delete or modify the access control settings of centralized cloud audit log storage, such as S3 buckets, Azure Log Analytics workspaces, or GCP log buckets. These actions aim to impair visibility into an adversary's activities, a common step in anti-forensics and data destruction workflows.
Detects chained AWS STS AssumeRole/AssumeRoleWithSAML/AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity events where a principal assumes a role in a different account and then quickly performs another role assumption from that new context. This pattern, often referred to as 'role chaining' or 'role laundering', is frequently used to obfuscate identity tracking and facilitate lateral movement across AWS account boundaries.
Page 147 of 1168